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Abstract
This dissertation analyzes advertising strategies in specialized markets like the
prescription drugs, travel, health insurance and real-estate markets where the consumers'
purchasing decisions are influenced by experts (e.g., doctors, travel agents, employers
and real-estate agents).
The first chapter studies the usefulness of advertising to both consumers and experts in
specialized markets. Inspired by the features of the prescription drugs market the study
shows that direct-to-consumer-advertising (DTCA) does not substitute for advertising
directed to physicians when physician-advertising is persuasive in nature. Furthermore,
the study analyzes advertising equilibriums in a two-firm setting and finds that it is
possible to have a sub-game perfect, non-symmetric Nash Equilibrium in which only one
firm advertises to the consumers and the other firm becomes a free-rider when, (i) the
number of patients who are aware of trsatment is very low, and (ii) there are very few
patients who insist for a particular drug.
The second chapter analyzes consumer-advertising incentives and strategies in
specialized markets in a multiple-firm setting. By analyzing the market stealing and
market expanding aspects of advertising, this study shows that in a sub-game perfect
equilibrium only some (and not all) firms may choose to advertise to consumers. From
the welfare perspective, consumer advertising is never socially optimal. Furthermore, a
simple game-theoretic model shows that when only some firms advertise to consumers,
the crucial determinant of advertising is the number of advertisers. In particular, with
increased competition from rival advertisers, each firm's advertising decreases. Using
annual, brand-level DTCA expenditure data for prescription drugs, the results from the
instrumental variable Tobit regressions give evidence of the negative impact of
competition on advertising.
The third chapter introduces variation in disease-familiarity in a multiple-firm model
of consumer-advertising and comparative static analysis shows that direct-to-consumer-
advertising is a decreasing function of disease-familiarity. Also, asymmetry at the firm
level is introduced in a two-firm setting to show that the brand which is relatively
preferred by the experts advertises more to the consumers.
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CHAPTER 1
Advertising in Specialized Markets:
Example from the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry
Abstract
This chapter studies the usefulness of advertising to both consumers and experts
in specialized markets like the prescription drugs, travel and real-estate markets where
the consumers'purchasing decisions are influenced by experts (e.g., doctors, travel
agents and real-estate agents). Inspired by the features of the prescription drugs
market the study shows that direct-to-consumer-advertising (DTCA) does not sub-
stitute for advertising directed to physicians when physician-advertising is persuasive
in nature. Furthermore, the chapter analyzes possible advertising equilibriums in
a two-firm setting and finds that it is possible to have a sub-game perfect, non-
symmetric Nash Equilibrium in which only one firm advertises to the consumers and
the other firm becomes a free-rider when, (i) the number of patients who are aware of
treatment is very low, and (ii) there are very few patients who insist for a particular
drug. Otherwise, for familiar diseases a non-advertising equilibrium is most likely.
Finally, consumer advertising can have welfare improving implications depending on
the disease types and patient characteristics.
1. OVERVIEW OF PHARMACEUTICAL ADVERTISIIVG
1. Overview of Pharmaceutical Advertising
In market economies, for most products a consumer himself decides whether and
how much to buy of. whi,ch brand. For some products, however, consumers are obli,u-
'ious in the sense that they are not aware of their best consumption choice. Instead
there is a third agent, whom we call erpert, who decides on behalf of the consumers
which product to purchase. Obli,ui,ous consumers either cannot or do not fully con-
trol their own consumption decisions. Some examples of such specialized markets are
the real-estate market, travel-agent market, prescription drugs market and contractor
market. In this paper we study advertising in such specialized markets. For example,
whether advertisement should be directed to the consumer or to the expert? How
should firms decide on consumer advertising? What implications might consumer
advertising have for social welfare?
Specialized markets such as the real-estate market, travel-agent market and the
contractor market differ from the prescription drugs market in a significant way that
consumers are obl'iu'ious by compulsion in the latter. A patient must rely on his
doctor's prescription for obtaining a prescription medicine, where as, a traveler has
complete freedom of choosing his own brand and to ignore the agent's recommenda-
tion. A patient's inability to choose his own medication has made direct-to-consumer-
advertising (DTCA) of prescription drugs a highly controversial means of promotion.
The US is one of the only two countries that allow DTCA of prescription drugs. The
rest of the world, with the exception of New Zealand, does not. This is why in this
paper we keep our focus on advertising in the US prescription drugs market and study
different advertising strategies and possible advertising equilibriums.
Direct-to-consumer-advertising(DTcA) of prescription drugs is a fairly new phe-
nomenon in the US. There was no interesting story to discuss even 20 years ago.
Physician advertisements in the forms of sampling, detailing and medical journal
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entries were the traditional ways of advertising prescription drugs. In recent years,
however, the drug companies tripled their advertisement budget to acquaint Ameri-
can consumers with diseases like depression, erectile dysfunction, acid reflux disease
and even toenail fungus. Especially after the relaxation of advertising restriction on
the broadcast media by the Food and Drug Administration in August 1997, direct-
to-consumer-advertising (DTCA) expenditure has skyrocketed. DTCA spending has
increased both in terms of dollar bills and as a percentage of total promotional spend-
ing. The average annual growth rate in DTCA was 33 percent between 1996 and 2000,
compared to aL4 percent growth rate for total promotional spending during the same
period. In 2001, spending for DTCA ($2.7 billion) comprised 15 percent of total pro-
motional spending, up from 8 percent ($800 million) in 19961. However, even though
DTCA has grown disproportionately compared to other forms of drug promotions
over the last decade, physicians still remain the primary focus of marketing efforts
(85 percent of total promotional spending)2.
It is a very interesting observation that DTCA is concentrated mostly among few
therapeutic classes of drugs like Antidepressants, PPI's, Antihistamines, Cholesterol
reducers, Nasal Sprays etc. where as physician promotion is universally accepted.
Another even more striking observation is that, even in the same therapeutic class,
not all the major players engage in DTCA(Table 1).
The interesting results that are common findings of the existing empirical research
state that DTCA
significantly increases sales of an entire class
has no significant effect on market share within a class
MYorkTimearticle(August3,2005:DrugMakersto
reports that spending on DTCA in 2004 was 4 billion dollars
2 rourru Prescription Drugs Trends, a chartbook update by Kaiser
2001.
Police Consumer Campaigns)
Family Foundation, November
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TAeLs 1. Approval Date and Promotion to Sales Ratios for Five Ther-
apeutic Classes, 1997-1999 (Source: Demand Effects of Recent Changes
in Prescription Drug Promotion, Rosenthal et. aI, June 2003)
FDA
approval
date
Total
Physician
Promotion to
Sales Ratio
3-year DTC
to sales
ratio
Antidepressants
CELtrXA
SERZOl\tr
EFFEXOR XR
PAXIL
ZOLOFT
PROZAC
PPIs
ACIPHEX
PREVACID
PRILOSEC
Antihistamines
ASTELIN
SEMPREX-D
ALLEGRA
ZYRTEC
CLARITI}I
Cholesterol
LESCOL
PRAVACHOL
LIPITOR
ZOCOR
MEVACOR
Nasal Sprays
NASOI\EX
RHII\OCORT
NASACORT
FLONASE
VAI\CENAStr
BECONASE
1998
r994
1993
1992
1991
1987
1 999
1995
1989
1996
7994
1996
1995
1993
1993
199 1
1996
199 1
1991
1997
r994
1991
L994
BEFORtr I9B2
BEFORE I9B2
0.52
0.35
0.21
0.16
0.14
0.09
2.05
0.15
0.08
0.68
0.44
0.26
0.30
0.08
0.18
0.13
0.72
0.11
0.02
0.48
0.32
0.47
0.20
0.40
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
001
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
000
0.11
0.15
0.06
0.00
0.05
0.01
0.03
0.00
0.23
0.00
0.09
0.r2
0.00
0.00
2. ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES AND /AIFEREAICES
Quest'ion: If the benefits of DTCA by a brand is shared by the entire class of
drugs, then why do only some brands take the burden of advertising? What can
explain the within-class variation of DTCA?
We provide a theoretical answer to this question in this paper.
There are few consumer-survey findings that might be of interest as well. The
most widely cited set of surveys are those conducted yearly by Preuention magazina
The 1997 survey finds that 29% of consumers asked for a particular prescription from
their doctor after veiwing an ad for that drug and 73% of those consumers got what
they requested.
This provides support for the widely suggested view that even if patients cannot write
their own prescriptions, they can, however, influence doctor's decision. We include
this feature in our models.
2. Economic objectives and inferences
Literature on advertising is plenty, economic researchers have also studied many
aspects of the expert/specialized markets. But studies of advertising in the specialized
market is scarce and this paper takes the first step to bridge this gap. Advertisers face
more complex choices in the specialized markets simply because purchasing decisions
are not made by purchasers. This is the age of speci,ali,zation and the more speci,alized
different markets become, the more we will see scenarios where manufacturers are left
with major marketing dilemmas. Our goal is to provide some theoretical justifications
and guidance for such advertising decisions.
Economic studies of advertising of prescription drugs to physicians by Bond and Lean
(7977), Hurwitz and Caves (1988), Leffer (1981), and Vernon (1981) suggested that
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this marketing was more "persuasive" than "informative" in nature, although the
distinction between the two was not unambiguous. There is literature on advertising
that assumes that advertising changes consumer preferences (Kaldor 1950), or adver-
tising that informs consumers about existence and price of a product (Butters 1977),
or advertising that informs consumers about product characteristics and price (Stigler
1961). Empirical papers have studied aspects of DTCA of prescription drugs using
US data. Berndt et al(1995), Iizuka(2004), Wosinska(2O02), Rosenthal et al(2003)
are to name a few.
Our models differ from the set ups of the mentioned studies because we explicitly
model some distinctive features of the US pharmaceutical advertising. In brief, our
models capture the following characteristics of the US prescription drugs market:
o Manufacturers can advertise to both doctors and consumers.
o Drug companies can influence doctor's preferences for different brands by
sending "benefits" in the form of advertisements.
o Even though patients cannot buy whatever medicine they like, patients can
strongly influence a doctor's prescribing decision by insisting for particu-
Iar brands. Patients can get influenced by direct-to-consumer-advertising
(DTCA) of prescription drugs.
o Some diseases or treatment-options are known to people more than others.
The theoretical models allow firms' parti,ci,pati,on dec'is'ions to be qualitatively differ-
ent from the decision of. hou much to advertise.3
The paper then answers some questions which have been raised regarding DTCA
of prescription drugs in the US:
3Empirical studies use sophisticated methods
cisions from "how much" decisions. However.
qualitatively the same.
(.g. two-stage models) to distinguish "whether" de-
theoretical models generally assume the two to be
6
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First we ask, within a class of drugs, why only some manufacturers bear the
burden of advertising when others become free riders? We analyze the advertising
equilibriums in prescription drugs market and find that it is possible to have a sub-
game perfect non-symmetric Nash-equilibrium (where both firms advertise to doctors
but only one firm bears the burden of advertising to consumers and the other firm
becomes a free-rider) when, (i)the number of patients who are aware of a treatment
is very low, and (ii) there are very few patients who insist for a particular brand of
drug. a
These results are quite intuitive. If the medicine is for very unfamiliar disease, then
unless patients see ads, they do not visit the doctor. Hence, if no firm advertises, there
is no market and all firms have zero profit. This gives incentive to the advertising
firm to continue advertising. On the other hand, the non-advertising firm is already
sharing the market as a free-rider. Since there are very few "stubborn"' people (peo-
ple who insist for particular brands after viewing an ad) the non-advertising firm will
not get extra market share by starting DTCA. On top of that, some non-stubborn
patients who already received ad from the other firm, will receive ads again which
will be a waste (they would see doctor anyway). Thus for the non-advertising firm,
marginal cost of advertising becomes greater than the marginal benefit of advertising.
Hence, we get the non-symmetric Nash equilibrium.
The second question is, when a firm decides to advertise to consumers, does it sub-
stitute doctor advertising with DTCA?
We find that in this set up once a firm decides to engage in DTCA, doctor and con-
sumer advertisings are not substitutes.
"Otherwise, for very familiar diseases a non-advertising equilibrium is most likely. That is, drugs
belonging to classes for which treatment is commonly known, do not advertise to consumers. We
also find that, all competing brands in a class are Iikely to advertise to consumers if number of
insisting patients are very high.
2. ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES AND INFERENCES
When there are few stubborn patients, then most patients rely on doctor's choice,
Even when there are many stubborn patients, doctor advertising still remains impor-
tant because once a stubborn patient sees ad for rival brands he becomes confused
and relies on doctor's judgment entirely.
From our analysis we also get some economic insight on the following two questions:
First, what could be welfare improving implications of DTCA?
When DTCA is done for unfamiliar diseases, more patients visit doctor and get proper
treatment because awareness about the disease increases. As long as there are not
many stubborn patients, doctor's decisions are not distorted due to DTCA. And
second, Why might DTCA be prohibited? When DTCA is done for very familiar
diseases, the only motivation for doing consumer ad is stealing market share (when a
stubborn patient views ad from only one brand and not from any rival). If we assume
that doctor is the best judge for prescriptions, any distortion of doctor's judgment is
socially undesirable. Also, when there are many stubborn patients then a symmetric
advertising equilibrium is most likely. As more firms advertise, more stubborn pa-
tients view ads from rival brands and depend entirely on doctor's decision as they
would in the first place if there was no DTCA. DTCA in this case results in a waste
of money without any real significance to any side.
We can theoretically justify the common empirical finding " DTCA increases market
size, but it has no significant effect on market share".
In reality the facts show significant within-class variation in DTCA and our models
suggest that such non-symmetric advertising is likely for unfamiliar diseases and when
patients are not stubborn in general. Also, it is easy to see that for unfamiliar dis-
eases DTCA increases awareness and hence market size, but the only channel through
which DTCA could affect market share is through stubborn patients. If there are not
many stubborn patients, DTCA has no significant effect on market share. Thus, our
3. MODELS DEMONSTRATING THE EXIS?ENCE OF SP,I{ES;
theoretical result supports the facts and empirical findings.
In section 3 we will describe the models and SPNE(subgame-perfect-Nash-Equilibrium).
Section 4 will summarize the findings and talk about the scope of this paper and its
limitations..
3. Models demonstrating the existence of SPNEs:
We consider an industry composed of two firms each of which produces one brand
of prescription drug for treating the same disease. The two brands of drugs are
homogeneous in the sense that a doctor's precision of a drug's ability to treat the
disease is same for both drugs. There are ly' consumers and one doctor where ,A/ is a
very large number. Only the doctor is aware of the existence and effectiveness of both
drugs. The firms can advertise to both doctor and consumers. Even though doctor is
ex-ante indifferent between prescribing either drug, his perceived preference changes
by the "rewards" or advertisements sent to him by each firm. If s; is the number
of advertisements the doctor receives from firm z, then doctor prescribes medicine z
with probability, #t,'i: I,2 (Tullock L967).
Marginal cost (MC) of advertising to doctor is C4, the same for both firms. Each firm's
consumer advertising follows the Butters'(L977) set up. Let firm i sends o1,i: I,2
advertisements to consumers. These are fliers randomly sent by each firm that contain
information on what disease/symptoms the drug is used for and how effective the drug
is for such treatment. Then with probabilities 0 and ? a consumer receives at least one
advertisement(ad) from firm 1 and firm2 respectively. Following Butter's advertising
model, if firm 1 sends o1 fliers to consumers, then the probability that a consumer
receives no ad from firm 1 is given by
(1 Lllv)"' N e-otlN
I
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since N is assumed to be a very large number. So, we can write,
P 
- 
1 
- 
e-otlN
and
7:L-e-oz/N
There is unit demand by each consumer. MC of advertising to consumers is C",
assumed same for both firms. There is an exogenously given probability { that a
consumer is "stubborn type". A stubborn person is easily impressed by an ad and
insists to the doctor for prescribing that brand of drug. If a doctor encounters a
stubborn person, he prescribes what the stubborn person wants. In case, a stubborn
person receives ad from both firms, then he is confused and relies entirely on doctor's
decision. A non-stubborn person always relies on doctor's wisdom.
There is another probability I that a consumer already knew (even if he did not re-
ceive any ad) about the existence of this disease and that the disease was treatable
by visiting the doctor. 5 We assume that every consumer is a potential patient if he
knows about the symptoms and treatment possibility.
To distinguish between a firm's participation decision and firm's decision of how much
to advertise we introduce the following simple assumption. If a firm chooses to ad-
vertise to consumers, it has to incur a small fixed cost, F which would not exist
otherwise. We can think of it as a regulatory requirement. For example, the FDA
requires that if a company advertises to consumers, it has to put up a website on
the internet that gives information on the drug's effectiveness and major side effects.
The companies who do not engage in DTCA do not have to have a website. But any
DIn Model I, d is assumed zero. That is, the
a consumer does not receive anv ad he does
Model II.
drugs are used to treat a very unfamiliar disease and if
not visit the doctor. This assumption will be relaxed in
10
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firm that does consumer advertising must comply to this regulation irrespective of
how much advertising it does.
It is widely accepted that demand is very price inelastic for brand name prescrip-
tion drugso These drugs are a necessity to a patient, there are not many substitutes
available and the effective price that an insured consumer has to pay is small. Pre-
scription coverage by insurance companies has been steadily increasing shifting the
burden of drug expenditures away from consumers to private and government insur-
ance programs.T. We assume that demand is price inelastic between [0,p] and for a
price higher than p, demand drops to zero. Firms do not compete over price, instead
price is given by market convention. However, price guarantees excess profit margin
8. Initially, we do not assume that both firms charge same price, but later we modify
this assumption with justification. Hence the choice variables for each firm are, "
number of doctor advertisements" and "number of consumer advertisements".
Each firm's advertising decision in made is 3 stages. In Stage d a firm decides whether
to advertise to consumers or not. In Stage Id amount of consumer advertisement is
chosen. And then in Stage IId amount of doctor advertisement is decided e. This is
a static game in the sense that no firm uses its experience from previous games to
make decision this period. This is a simultaneous move game where firms observe
each other's move at the end of every stage.
To solve the model by backward induction, first we find out profit maximizing
levels of s1 and s2 given 01 and oz. Then we substitute s1(o1, o2);s2(o1,o2) in the
6In onr entire analysis we implicitly assume that there are no over-the-counter medicines available
for treating the same disease. This guaranties that once a consumer is aware of a disease, he has to
visit the doctor. We also assume that there are no generic substitute drugs available for these two
brand-name drugs.
7 Sour"", Prescription Drugs Trends, a chart book update by Kaiser Family Foundation, November
2001
8The minimum profit margin required for consistent analysis is p > 8C,
ewe do not know if doctor and consumer advertising decisions are made jointly by firms in reality
or in what order they are made. We assume that the game is played in this order
11
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original profit functions to find the profit maximizing levels of o1 and a2 in terms of
the parameters of the model. And finally, we compare four different cases(different
sub-games) where either both firms advertise to consumers, or one advertises but the
other does not and where no one advertises to consumers. By comparing expected
profits in all these cases we are able to determine if there is any pure strategy sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium in this game.
Model I: Unfamiliar disease (0 :0)
Expected profit function for firm 1 is written as:
Eltrl: NpioB$- r) + :iton + (t - il@it - 7t)\l- otc.- srca- F.6Ltb2
Q/G-l) are insistent patients who received advertisement(s) from only firm 1 and
not from firm2,, so they make the doctor prescribe drug 1. The rest of the patients
depend on the doctor's prescribing probability, tfu. These include those insistent
patients who received advertisements from both firms, SB1, and the non-insistent
patients who received at least an advertisement from any firm, (1 
- il@ + I - 0l).
Writing the probabilities 0 and 7 in terms of the choice variables 01 and o2, the
profit function for firm 1 now looks like
T2
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Efur1(o1,"r)] : Npi6(l-e-"'/N)e'"2/N * * ft -e-ot/Ne-oz/N*51tJ2
2Qs-or/N s-oz/N 
- 
$e-ot/N 
- 
Qe-62/uS] - orC" - stCa - F
Similarly for firm 2 the profit function can be written as:
Efur2l : Np2ldl1 
- Ot* 
=il-t dh + G - 6)@ * t - g:,jl - ozc. - s2ca - F51t52
d0- 0)l are insistent patients who received advertisement(s) from only firm 2 and
not from firm 1, so they make the doctor prescribe drug 2. The rest of the patients
depend on the doctor's prescribing probability, #. These include those insistent
patients who received advertisements from both firms, $81, and the non-insistent
patients who received at least an advertisement from any firm, (1 
- il(B + I - 0l).
Thus,
Eln2(o2,"r)] : Np2lQs-"r/t(t 
- 
e-",lN)+ jL (f 
- 
e-ollNe-o,/N*
51tJ2
2Se-ot/N s-or/N 
- 
Qe.-or/N - de-"zll1] - orC" - szCa - F
3.1. Case I z o1 : 0, o2 :0. Since in model I we have assumed that no consumer
visits the doctor unless he receives an ad, for Case I, expected profit of both firms is
going to be zero. That is,
Elnt(ot, sr)] : 0
13
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E[tr2(o2,sz)] : 0
3.2. Case II : o1 :0,o2 I 0. Here we see the "market expansion effect" of
consumer-advertisement in an emphasized manner. Market changes from zero to
a significant positive number even when only one firm chooses to advertise to the
consumers. This effect is emphasized due to the assumption that no consumer visits
the doctor unless he receives at least one advertisement. Solving the first order
conditions of profit maximizations for both firms with respect to s1 and s2 gives
(calculations for Model I are presented in Appendix A (1)),
s1 Pt
s1 *sz h*pz
and
S2 Pz
51*sz Pt*Pz
And also.
n?Pi 
,*rt 
- ilG - e-o'/n), i,i : r,2; i, + iSi
3.2.L Discuss'ion on Price: Even though price is a parameter in this model, it
is evident from the above analysis that the higher the relative price of a firm the
higher will be its market share. This is apparently a strange result that comes from
the assumption of price-inelasticity of demand in a given range (above which demand
vanishes). Given this is true, it is now reasonable to assume that both firms charge
the highest parametric price p for which demand is positive.
Rosenthal et al (2003) estimated how relative price affects relative market share of
prescription drugs. They found that IV estimates of the coefficient on the price
variable were positive and significant. Their inference was that perhaps their price
L4
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variable was measured with error. The above analysis complements their empirical
findings and gives one possible explanation for the unexpected sign on the price coef-
ficient. Hence later in the paper we will assume for simplicity that both firms charge
the same exogenous price p.
Lemma t: The higher the relatiue price of a firm, the hi,gher i,s'its relati,ae market
share.
Expected profits of both firms are solved in terms of the parameters of the model:
Eftr1l:N---4-.(1 
-"" 
C'(h+P2Y 
)\Pt-rPz)' Q)\r-M)
And,
nr ., Npr(6p? + 2dptp, + pZ)Eltr2): ffi-Nc.ll ilogp, +log($pl + 2ilp'pz + pZ)
- 
log C" 
- 
2log(p1+ pz)l 
- 
F
3.3. Case III : o1 * 0,or:0. We follow the same procedure to find profits of
both firms in terms of the parameters of the model:
n, . Na(6p7+2dprpr+p?)Elnl : ffi - NC"IL* Iogp, + rog($p?, + 2dprpz + p?)
- 
IogC" 
- 
2log(py + pz)l 
- 
F
and
E[n2]: , *,4 ,u(r - d) (1- 
-- 
9-"@td' \lh+pr1"' ')\'-M)
15
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3.4. Case IV : o1 # 0,oz I 0. Following the same steps as the previous cases
and imposing ?r : p2 we get,
(p 
- 
4c") + 6@ + 2oC")
Eln'l
IVC]log p * Ios(
e +0
+il-losB-logC"l-F
and
x (p - 4c") + o@ + 2ac")Elnrl:
+Q
NC"llos 2 +los(1 + 2il 
- 
los(
-il] -l'
3.5. Analysis of Nash Equilibrium. Now that we have calculated expected
profit for each firm (in terms of the parameters of the model) in different sub-games, it
is possible to compare the profits under the different consumer advertising strategies
a firm might choose. Due to our simplifying assumption in Model I that no consumer
knows about a possible treatment until he receives an ad, we can rule out the possi-
bility of (ot : 0,o2:0) being a SPNE. It also makes our job easier to analyze the
other possibilities. For example, we now want to check if (o1 : 0,oz l0) can be a
Nash equilibrium of this game. We need to check only one condition for this, whether
Ertl (ot 
- 
0; oz + 0)
That is, we need to verify if,
.,AtI
4
r6c.(r+20)
p
r6c c(r+20)
p
L6C.(r+26)
p
r6c 
"(L+26)p
L6C.(r
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io -q)ttffi,
-C"[loS p * log(
+ 6(p + 20C") 
1
' 
IUL,z4 \I1-zvf + Qr-o
+il-losB-losC")-F
Analytically) we can surely say that L.H.S of the above inequality is greater than
R.H.S., if O :0. The difference exactly equals the value C.lflogp - jlogC.- Iog 2] +
F lN . This value has to be positive as this represents the ratio of the number of
consumer advertisements sent by firm 1 in equilibrium (when both firms advertise to
consumers) to the number of patients plus the fixed cost of advertising as a fraction of
N. Hence, al $ :0 it is possible to have a sub-game perfect, non-symmetricl0 Nash
equilibrium in which one firm bears the burden of advertising and the other firm
becomes a free-ri,der. Also, if we compare z1l(41 :0,021 0) and rzl(ot:0,02 + 0),
we find that in a non-symmetric equilibrium the free-riding firm earns more profit
(when d:0).
As @ increases to 1, it is impossible to have a non-symmetric equilibrium given a high
profit margin. In that case, for d = L, the symmetric-advertising equilibrium is most
likely.
In general, for very low values of S it is possible to have a non-symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 1": For unfam'il'iar d'iseases (0 :0) a non-symmetric sub-game per-
fect Nash equi,Ii,bri,um (when one firm bears the burden of aduerti,s'ing to consun'Lers
and the other firm becomes a free-rider) can erist onlg when $ x 0. Oth,eruise, a
10
--non-svmmetric in terms of firms' decisions to advertise to consumers
T7
r6Cc(r+26)
p
r6cc(r+26)
p
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symmetri,c aduertis'ing equili,brium'is most li,kely.
Model II: Introducing I
In Model I, firms had two channels of gaining from doing DTCA. First was through
/ which directly affected a firm's market share, and the second was simply through
the "market expansion effect" of DTCA. Now we want to be able to neutralize the
market expansion effect by introducing a parameter 0 - probability that a consumer
already knows about the disease or treatment possibility. In other words, now patients
visit the doctor even without viewing any ad with probability 9. We can make I 
= 
1
to analyze the case when DTCA impacts a firm's profit only through @. The profit
functions now look like the following (after writing s1 and s2 as functions of a1 and
or)t
Efur{o1)l : Npd$ 
- 
e-o,lN)e-oz/N *Ytft 
- A - qQ - e-otlN - e-o2/N)-+
(L 
- 
s-"r/N)(r 
- 
e-",tt)(1 
- 
2O 
- 
0) + 0l 
- 
olCs 
- 
F
Just Iike the previous model, dQ - 
"-ot/N)s-oz/N are the insistent patients who
received advertisement(s) from only firm 1. The rest of the patients depend on the
doctor's decision entirely.
The same w&y,
and s2 as functions
the
of
profit function for firm 2 can be written as (after writing s1
o1 and oz),
1B
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Eltr2(o2)l : NpdQ 
- 
"-oz/N)e-o'/N * #n, - O - 0)(2 - e-or/N - "-oz/N1-
(r 
- 
s-",1u)(r 
- 
e-",t")(t 
- 
2O 
- 
0) + 0] 
- 
ozC. 
- 
F
As in Model I, we again find expected profits of firms in four different cases in
terms of the parameters which enable us to analyze the existence of SPNEs of this
game (calculations presented in Appendix A (Z)).
3.6. Analysis of Nash Equilibriurnz 0l 0. Now the goal is to find out pos-
sible conditions under which particular advertising strategies can be SPNEs. Again,
Iet us focus on the non-symmetric strategy payoffs when firm 1 does not advertise
to consumers, but firm 2 chooses to do consumer-advertising. To see whether this
particular strategy-combination is a SPNE, we need to satisfy 2 conditions :
Condit'ion 1
Tr tlot-o ,oz*o
and
Cond'ition 2
frzlor_-o,oz*o
Condition 1 requires that,
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Itr,. /
+LpQ
IYp,
+
6tv c.o
DEMOAIS"RATIITG THE E,XISTEIVCE OF SPI{ES;
4' +o
NC"lr* logp * Iog(1 I f, * !96 + 2O - e1 + d)- log8 - rogC"l - Fup
and
Condi,t'ion 2 requires that,
r/_ 0
iWtt + 3il - 4C.) - NC.[logp+ log(1 + 3d -0) - log4 - log c.] - F, Np 4
The conditions are computationally too complicated to derive any general conclu-
sions. So, for our purpose we study them under different extreme values of 0 and Q.
Hence, we can make analysis of few different cases that will shed light on likelihoods
of different symmetric and non-symmetric sub-game perfect Nash Equilibriums for
different parameter values.
3.6.!. Case 'i: $ : 0,0 :1. In this case, Condi'ti'on 1 always holds 11 but Con-
di,ti,on 2 is never satisfied t'. So, in this case a non-symmetric equilibrium is never
possible. If so, then which symmetric equilibrium is likely? Analysis of the profit
functions show that a symmetric non-advertising equilibrium is the only possibility
in this case. This result is very intuitive. If everyone knows about existence of a
treatment, then consumer-advertising loses its "informative" quality. So, on top of
11
This analysis assumes that
l2Because
* C"[1 + logp 
- 
log 8 
- 
log C"] > 0
margin is at least as large to allow p > 8C.
I C"[1 + logp * log 4 
- 
log C"] I 0
F
l/
profit
F
t/
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that if there are no stubborn patients, no firm has any incentive to engage in DTCA.
Proposition 2: No firm adaerti,ses to consumers i,n equil'ibrium (ot:0, oz:0)
if there o,re no stubbom pati,ents (O :0) and i,f pat'ients are fully awa,re of the sAnlp-
toms and treatment possi,bi,lity (0 :1).
3.6.2. Case i,i,: $: 1,0 :1. In this case, Condi,ti,on 1 and Condi,ti,on 2 cannot
hold simultaneously. Hence, a non-symmetric equilibrium can be ruled out with cer-
tainty. Under our assumption of very high profit margin, there should be a symmetric
advertising equilibrium 13. This result is intuitive too: If every patient is stubborn,
DTCA acts as a major source of increasing market share. Firms advertise because,
any patient who receives ad from only one firm contributes to that firm's market
share. Also, any patient who received ad from the other firm gets nullified (depends
on doctor's decision only)as soon as they receive an ad from this firm too. In Model
I we saw that when 0 :0 but / : 1, then too the symmetric advertising equilibrium
was expected. There the same intuition worked, also DTCA maintained its informa-
tive value since the disease was very unfamiliar. However, if profit margin is not so
high, a symmetric non-advertising equilibrium cannot be ruled out.
We can summarize all the intuition from our analysis of advertising equilibriums in
Table 2. Similar analysis can be done to show that when d : 0 but 0 > 0, non-
symmetric equilibrium is likely for low values of d. But as value of 0 increases, a
symmetric-nonadvertising equilibrium becomes most likely. In short,
13This requires,
413C" + F I Iv * C"llos p * los( + 1) - Ios8 - logC"l < pla+
2T
6C"32C.
p , 32C"
-r p*
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For / N 0, e = 0 the only advertising equilibrium is a non-symmetri,c equi-
librium.
When d N 0, but d is very high, a symmetric non-aduerti,si,ng equlhbrium is
likely.
As value of @ becomes high, Y0, a symmetric aduertisi,ng equrhbrium becomes
most likely.
0 
- 
0 0
d:0 Non-Symmetric Symmetric Non-Advertising
0-1 Symmetric Advertising Symmetric Advertising
2 ,ikelihood of different ac vertisins SPNEs for differen pa-Tnsr.B . L
rameter values
As we have already mentioned, surveys done in the US find that the value of @ is
very small. Hence we can claim that in this country, diseases for which 0 is high
should see much less DTCA.
3.7. Correlation Between Doctor and Consumer Advertisements. So
far, we have seen under what conditions firms might choose to engage in DTCA.
The question that automatically follows is whether a firm that decides to do con-
sumer advertising reduces number of advertisements sent to the doctor. Are doctor
and consumer advertisements negatively correlated? Especially if number of stub-
born patients are very high, it might make sense to not advertise to doctors as much,
instead increase DTCA so that patients make the doctor prescribe whatever they
want.
However, we find that in these models DTCA always complements doctor advertise-
ments. Even in the case where d : I, we find that DTCA and doctor-advertising
are positively correlated. Amount of doctor advertising for the firms (s;) is solved in
22
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terms of the parameters and o1 and o2. Ftom here it can be shown that fi is not
less than zero, that is, doctor and consumer advertising are not substitutes. Similar
conclusion follows tor ffi. This analysis for firm 1 is shown below:
A/n
si.li_r,2- ffift (1 - 2il€-otlN e-o,lN - O(e-o,lN + e-ozlt)]
#- ffil#.--.ortN e_'oztN + O o-oL/*l' l,/"
+ P 
- 
+le-o,/n {Q +(1 21)€-ozlt}l'\ot 4Ca'"
rr dstTence,;
+Q
But this inequality does not hold for any A Thus, firm
advertising with consumer advertising. Even with both
same conclusion holds.
do not
0 and
substitute physician
0 in the model, the
This result is not surprising intuitively if we think carefully. Doctor advertising is
always very important for firms because we assume that even a stubborn person relies
on the doctor's prescribing decision if he receives ad from more than one firm. Hence,
when / is very high a firm advertises to consumers because (i)it hopes to reach some
stubborn patients to whom the other firm's ad did not reach and (ii)the firm wants
its own ad to reach all those patients who have received the other firm's ad. Doctor
advertisement is always important because the doctor makes decision on behalf of
non-stubborn patients and also those stubborn patients who received ad from both
firms.
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Proposition 3.' Aduerti,si,ng to consumers does not substitute for aduerti,sing di-
rected, to physicians (fr > O).
4. Scope and limitations
Our goal was to find out which advertising strategies are likely to be employed
and under what circumstances when it comes to promoting a product in a specialized
market set up. Focusing specifically on the pharmaceutical industry we find that
engaging in DTCA is indeed the logical thing to do for companies if,
(1) a lot of consumers are willing to contribute to their own prescription deci-
sions, and
(2) the prescription medication is used to treat unfamiliar diseases
Our analysis is based on the assumption that the companies must have a very
high profit margin. Indeed, pharmaceuticals more often than not rank as the most
profitable sector in the United States 14. The observed trendl5 in advertising by the
US pharmaceutical companies can be well-explained by our model. Our theoretical
conclusion complements the empirical finding by Iizuka (2004) that DTCA is mostly
done for under-treated diseases. That is, we see DTCA for disease categories that
have very low values of d in general. Also, according to surveys l6conducted by sev-
eral pharmaceutical research groups only very small percent of patients can be called
stubborn consumers. Less than 30% patients talk to their doctors after viewing an
ad about a particular drug, and only few of them effectively succeed to make their
doctors prescribe what they wanted. So, this suggests that / is not very large for
US patients and these can well explain why we find only some companies bearing
the burden of advertising to consumers while others selling competing brands become
t^r"",ral F*t,tne 500 ranking of America's top industries
lSConcentration of DTCA among very few classes of drugs
l6For exa-ple, 1997 Prevention magazine survey
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free-riders on themlT. As we have already mentioned, in reality we find significant
within-class variation in DTCA and our models suggest that such non-symmetric
advertising is likely for unfamiliar diseases and when patients are not stubborn in
general. AIso, it is easy to see that for unfamiliar diseases DTCA increases awareness
and hence marketsize, but the only channel through which DTCA could affect market
share is through stubborn patients. If there are not many stubborn patients, DTCA
has no significant effect on marketshare. Thus, our theoretical result supports the
facts and empirical findings.
It is very difficult to do an explicit analysis of the welfare effects of DTCA in this
set up. However, intuitively we can say that if DTCA is done for low I (unfamiliar-
disease), then it has a welfare improving effect. Patients who would not otherwise be
treated now consult a physician and get treatment as a result of DTCAl8. However,
if DTCA is done for high / (more consumers are stubborn type) it is likely to have
a welfare-reducing effect if we assume that insisting patients distort doctor's erperl,
decision, or arguing with patients result in the waste of valuable time (many doctor
surveys suggest this). But whether the overall effect of DTCA on welfare is positive
or negative will depend on the relative values of I and / for each particular disease
category and market.
Another point to notice here is that, we show that doctor advertising is important
even if it does not inform quality or existence. Normally people believe that all drug
companies advertise to doctors because doctors need to know about the product and
its quality. But we show that even if doctor knows about the product and its quality,
firms still have incentives to heavily advertise to doctors as long as doctors can be
tWitfrin-.f'r* variation in DTCA participation decision
l8Again, our crucial assumption here is that there are no OTC medicines for these prescription drugs.
Otherwise, even when patients do not see a doctor, they can treat themselves using over-the-counter
drugs
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influenced.
There are a few reasons why we present our analysis in the context of the pharma-
ceutical industry rather than in a general framework of manufacturers, experts and
patients. Analysis in terms of pharmaceutical companies, doctors and patients make
a simpler intuitive appeal. But the main reasons for this specification lie in our as-
sumptions. Even though in all specialized markets advertisers face similar choices,
the market structures are often subtly different. In other specialized markets con-
sumers can choose not to consult an expert, our models do not take that possibility
into account. Our assumption regarding price-inelastic demand would be very strong
for most other expert markets. Finally, there are no such advertising regulations in
most other markets which will allow us to theoretically distinguish between adver-
tiser's participation decision and his decision of how much to advertise. These are the
reasons why our theory best fits the pharmaceutical market set up. The theoretical
analysis can fit well the markets for luxury real-estate, luxury-travel, upscale interior
designing or landscaping. Because in these scenarios, the consumers are much Iess
responsive to relative price and hiring-of-experts is often a common practice.
Our results still appeal intuitively for other specialized markets in the sense that con-
sumer advertising will be profitable if the product is unfamiliar and if consumers are
willing to impose their judgment on the hired experts.
This paper is only the first step in studying advertising prospects and challenges in
a specialized market setting. We believe there is a lot of scope for research in this
area that can generate useful economic insights. Empirical test for the theoretical
propositions derived in this paper are difficult due to unavailability of data. We are
working on finding acceptable proxy variables.
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CHAPTER 2
Competition and Advertising in Specialized Markets: A
Study of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry
Abstract
This chapter analyzes advertising incentives and strategies in specialized markets,
in which consumers' decisions are dictated by experts. By analyzing the market
stealing and market expanding aspects of advertising, this study shows that in a
sub-game perfect equilibrium only some (and not all) firms may choose to advertise
to consumers. From the welfare perspective, consumer advertising is never socially
optimal. Furthermore, a simple game-theoretic model shows that when only some
firms advertise to consumers, the crucial determinant of advertising is the number
of advertisers. In particular, with increased competition from rival advertisers, each
firm's advertising decreases. Modeling specific features of the U.S. prescription drugs
market the theoretical analysis suggests that the wide variation in direct-to-consumer-
advertising (DTCA) by U.S. pharmaceutical companies both within and across drug
classes is due to differences in disease-familiarity and heterogeneity in patients' types.
Using annual, brand-level DTCA expenditure data for prescription drugs, the results
from the instrumental variable Tobit regressions give evidence of the negative impact
of competition on advertising.
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1. Introduction
In most markets the consumers themselves make all their purchasing decisions.
For some markets, however, the consumers are oblivious in the sense that they are
not aware of their best consumption choices. Instead there are agents or erperts, who
decide on behalf of the consumers which product to purchase, how much to purchase
and whether to make any purchase at all. Some examples of such speci,ali,zed markets
are the real-estate market, travel market, prescription drugs market and contractor
market. While previous studies have investigated aspects of expert-advertising in
specialized markets,l so far there are very few economic studies of direct-to-consumer-
advertising (DTCA) in presence of market experts2. The aim of this paper is to
analyze different consumer-advertising strategies that can benefit the manufacturers
in the specialized markets.
The first goal of this paper is to explain, using theoretical models, why the strat-
egy of consumer-advertising can be beneficial to manufacturers even when the con-
sumers do not control their own purchasing decisions. That is, the goal is to see what
incentives firms have to spend on advertising targeted to consumers when consump-
tion choices are made by someone else. Next, the paper studies whether consumer-
advertising strategy should be universally accepted or rejected by all firms in the
market, or in equilibrium, only some firms will choose to engage in consumer ad-
vertising. From a welfare perspective the paper comments on whether there is "too
much" or "too little" advertising in equilibrium. Furthermore, the research inves-
tigates how competition affects advertising in specialized markets. In doing so the
tF.. 
"""*p1", Bond and Lean (1977), Hurwitz and Caves (1988), Leffer (1981), Vernon (1931).2Theoretical studies of DTCA are extremely scarce. Rubin and Schrag (1999) studies how consumer-
advertising by a monopolist seller in the prescription drugs market can influence a HMO's incentives
to choose a cheaper alternative. On the empirical ground, however, some recent papers (Berndt
et al (1995), Rosenthal et al (2003), Iizuka and Jin (2005), Wosinska (2002)) study DTCA in the
prescription drugs market with a clear emphasis on the demand-side analysis. Iizuka (2004) provides
a supply-side study of DTCA.
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study analyzes whether the effect of competition is captured by the total "number
of competitors", or by the "number of competitors who advertise" when only some
brands in the market engage in advertising. Finally, some of the theoretical findings
are empirically tested using U.S. data.
The research on DTCA is now even more relevant because the recent upsurge in
DTCA expenditure by the U.S. pharmaceutical industry has caught the attention
of people from different fields of study. The theoretical models used in this paper
are inspired by the features of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. The U.S. is one of
the only two countries that allow consumer advertising of prescription drugs. The
rest of the world, with the exception of New ZeaIand, does not. A patient's inability
to choose his own medication has made direct-to-consumer-advertising (DTCA) of
prescription drugs a highly controversial means of promotion.
The research in this paper finds that the firms can have both market-expanding
and business-stealing motives for advertising to consumers even when the consumers
have to depend on the experts for their purchasing decisions. When consumer adver-
tising has only market-expanding effects, some firms bear the burden of advertising
while their competitors become free-riders on them.
The equilibrium analysis suggests that the observed variation in consumer ad-
vertising by the U.S. pharmaceutical companies both within and across therapeutic
classes is due to differences in disease-familiarity and heterogeneity in patients' types.
When patients do not try to influence their doctors' decisions, then for familiar dis-
eases there should be no advertising at all. But if the disease is very unfamiliar, then
some firms always engage in DTCA.
There is an ongoing debate regarding the effect of DTCA on social welfare. This
paper shows that for market-expanding advertising, oligopolistic firms choose less
than the socially optimum level of advertisements. However, when advertising has
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only market-stealing effects, there is "too much" advertising by firms which results
in a social waste.
The theoretical analysis also implies that consumer-advertising by each firm is
negatively affected by competition from other advertisers in the market. The theo-
retical models establish a direct relationship between advertising and the number of
advertisers.
Finally, empirical investigation supports the negative association between adver-
tising and competition from other advertisers. Using annual, brand-level direct-to-
consumer-advertising (DTCA) expenditure data for brand-name prescription drugs
belonging to 5 therapeutic classes over the period 1996-1999, empirical study (instru-
mental variable Tobit regressions) offers support for the negative relationship between
consumer advertising expenditure and competition from rival advertisers.
The following section provides a brief overview of DTCA of prescription drugs in
the U.S. and summarizes the literature related to this paper. Section 3 describes the
theoretical models of consumer advertising in a specialized market set-up. Section 4
presents details of the empirical framework for testing theoretical results and reports
the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
2. Brief Overview of Advertising of Prescription Drugs
Direct-to-consumer-advertising (DTCA) of prescription drugs is a fairly new phe-
nomenon in the U.S.. Until 20 years ago, physician advertisements in the forms of
sampling, detailing and medical journal entries were the traditional ways of advertis-
ing prescription drugs. In recent years, however, drug companies have increased their
advertisement budget to acquaint American consumers with diseases like depression,
erectile dysfunction, acid reflux disease and toenail fungus etc. After the relaxation of
advertising restriction on the broadcast media by the Food and Drug Administration
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(FDA) in August 1997, direct-to-consumer-advertising (DTCA) expenditure by the
U.S. pharmaceutical companies has skyrocketed. DTCA spending has increased both
in absolute terms and as a percentage of total promotional spending. The average
annual growth rate in DTCA was 33 percent between 1996 and 2000, compared to
a 14 percent growth rate for total promotional spending during the same period. In
2001, spending for DTCA ($2.7 billion) comprised 15 percent of total promotional
spending, up from 8 percent ($800 million) in 19963. Even though DTCA has grown
disproportionately compared to other forms of drug promotions over the last decade,
physicians still remain the primary focus of marketing efforts (85 percent of total
promotional spending)4.
The U.S. pharmaceutical companies have universally accepted the strategy of mar-
keting prescription drugs to the physicians. However, they differ significantly in their
practice when it comes to promoting prescription drugs directly to the consumers:
o Consumer advertising of prescription drugs is limited to very few therapeutic
classes.
r Even within a class of drugs there exists significant variation in DTCA par-
ticipation.
There are a few consumer-survey findings that are interesting as well. The most
widely cited set of surveys are those conducted yearly by Preuention magazine. The
1997 survey finds that 29% of consumerc asked for a particular prescription from their
doctor after viewing an advertisement for that drug and 73% of those consumers got
what they requested.
This provides some support for the view that even if patients cannot write their
3A recent New York Times article (August 3, 2005: Drug Makers to Police
reports that spending on DTCA tn 2004 was 4 billion dollars
4 rource, Prescription Drugs Trends, a chartbook update by Kaiser Family
200r.
Consumer Campaigns)
Foundation. November
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own prescriptions, they try to influence their doctor's decision. It should be noted,
however, that there is no information available in these surveys on whether the doctor
was going to prescribe that particular brand anyway or he did it due to the pressure
from the patient.
2.1. Existing Literature. Early theoretical literature relating competition and
advertising found that with increased competition advertising decreases. Grossman
and Shapiro (1984) studied the case of differentiated product oligopoly and found
that with increase in the number of close substitutes, consumers are likely to receive
an advertisement from a product that provides a better match and this reduces a
firm's incentive to advertise. On the other hand, there are papers which conclude
that firms increase advertising when competition intensifies. Becker and Murphy
(1993) give exampless and argue that firms may try to distinguish themselves from
their close substitute products by using advertising and this will lead to an increase
in advertising expenditure. In case of business-stealing advertising, Cabral (2000) ar-
gues that incentive to advertise may increase as the number of competitors increases.
Since the Iiterature generally does not distinguish between advertising participation
decision and choice of advertising quantity, the number of competitors is often equiv-
alent to the number of competitors who advertise. Theoretical paper by Haller and
Chakrabarti (2002), one of the exceptions, finds that equilibrium levels of advertising
decrease in the total number of firms.
Economic studies of advertising of prescription drugs to physicians by Bond and Lean
(L977), Hurwitz and Caves (1988), Leffer (1981), and Vernon (1981) suggested that
this marketing was more "persuasive" than "informative" in nature, although the
distinction between the two was not unambiguous. There is literature on advertising
sThey mention that products in competitive markets are advertised to persuade consumers. For
example, Perdue chicken is extensively advertised to convince consumers that a pound of Perdue
chicken is worth significantly more than any other company's chicken.
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that assumes that advertising changes consumer preferences (Kaldor 1950), or adver-
tising that informs consumers about existence and price of a product (Butters 1977),
or advertising that informs consumers about product characteristics and price (Stigler
1961). The only published theoretical study of DTCA, is by Rubin and Schrag (1999)
who showed that a monopolist seller of prescription drugs could use DTCA to influ-
ence the HMO's preference for cheaper drugs for its patients. Of course, the objective
and setting of this paper is very different from Rubin and Schrag.6
Empirical papers have studied demand aspects of DTCA of prescription drugs
using U.S. data. For example, Berndt et al (1995), Iizuka and Jin (2003), Wosinska
(2002), Rosenthal et al (2003) to name a few. These papers find that DTCA increases
market size for an entire class, but it has no significant impact on market share within
a class. On the supply side Iizuka (2004) finds out that drugs that are new, for under
treated diseases and are of high quality are more likely to be advertised to consumers.
Iizuka (2004) also finds that with increased competition from other firms) consumer
advertising decreases. In a very influential empirical study, Telser (1964) found little
support for an inverse association between advertising and competition, despite some
plausible theorizing to the contrary. In brief, there is no unanimity in the literature
regarding how advertising is affected by increased competition.
3. Theoretical Models of Consumer Advertising
The main goal of the theoretical analysis is to model the features of a market
where a consumer's purchasing decisions are made by an expert and study how the
firms make their decisions regarding consumer advertising. The main features of the
models are inspired by the U.S. prescription drugs market. Two separate theoretical
oA companion paper of this paper, "Advertising in Specialized Markets: Example from the U.S.
Pharmaceutical Industry", analyzes the existence of sub-game perfect Nash Equilibriums in a two-
firm setting in light of the prescription drugs market and finds conditions for SPNEs.
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questions are asked regarding consumer advertising. First, this section investigates
how advertising is affected by competition from other firms. Second, the equilibrium
number of advertising firms are chosen.
The Setup:
There are three different groups of agents in the model. Fi,rms who sell brand-
name prescription drugs, potenti,al pati,ents (consumers)who want to purchase those
medications and doctors who write prescriptions for the patients. At the beginning of
the game, each firm decides whether to advertise to consumers or not and depending
on that decision they decide how much to advertise. The advertising firms then send
out advertisements randomly to consumers and each consumer maA receive adver-
tisements from one or more firms. The patients then see the doctors. The doctors
make their prescribing decisions based on their conversation with the patients and
their prior knowledge of each drug. Once a patient gets a prescription, he purchases
the drug.
On the supply side, there are 4 oligopolistic firms selling brand-name drugs that
belong to the same therapeutic class. A firm makes profit only if a patient is prescribed
its brand by the doctor. All firms can advertise to consumers. Marginal cost of
advertising to consumers is C (C > 0), assumed same for all firms. Marginal cost of
production is normalized to zero.
Firms who advertise to consumers randomly send out fliers which contain infor-
mation on what disease/symptoms the drug is used to treat and how effective the
drug is for treatment.
To distinguish between a firm's participation decision and the firm's decision of how
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much to advertise the following simple assumption is introduced . If a firm chooses
to advertise to consumers, it has to incur a small fixed cost, F which would not exist
otherwise. It can be thought of as a regulatory requirement. For example, the FDA
requires that if a company advertises to consumers, it has to put up a website on
the internet that gives information on the drug's effectiveness and major side effects.
The companies who do not engage in consumer advertising do not have to have a
website. But any firm that does consumer advertising must comply to this regulation
irrespective of. how much advertising it does.
The amount of doctor advertising by a firm is exogenous and normalized to zero.7
There are .ly' consumers in the market and l/ is assumed to be very large. Each
consumer has unit demand. To focus on firms' advertising decisions, demand is
assumed to be price-inelastic.8 In the entire analysis it is implicitly assumed that
there are no over-the-counter medicines available for treating the same disease. This
guaranties that once a consumer is aware of a disease, he has to visit the doctor. We
also assume that there are no generic substitute drugs available for these brand-name
drugs.
Even though a patient cannot write his own prescription, he can however, influence
a doctor's decision for obtaining a particular brand of drug. There is an exogenously
/In a companion paper, it was shown that even when doctor advertising is persuasive, it does not
have any trade off with consumer advertising. The same intuition will hold in this set up. In this
paper the focus is on consumer advertising only.
8It is widely accepted that demand is price inelastic for brand name prescription drugs. These drugs
are a necessity to a patient, there are not many substitutes available and the effective price that
an insured consumer has to pay is small. Prescription coverage by insurance companies has been
steadily increasing shifting the burden of drug expenditures away from consumers to private and
government insurance programs.
Source: Prescription Drugs Tlends, a chart book update by Kaiser Family Foundation, November
2001.
It is assumed that the demand is price inelastic between [0, p] and for a price higher than p, demand
drops to zero. It automatically follows from this assumption that each firm will charge the highest
possible price p for which demand is positive. Firms do not compete over price, instead price is
given by market convention. However, price guaranties excess profit margin.
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given probability @ that a consumer is "insistent type". An insistent person is easily
impressed by an advertisement and insists to the doctor for prescribing that brand
of druge. If a doctor encounters an insistent person, he prescribes what the insistent
person wants. In case, an insistent person receives advertisement from more than
one firm, then he is confused and relies entirely on the doctor's decision. A non-
insistent person always relies on the doctor's wisdom. No patient is ex-ante aware of
the existence and effectiveness of any brand of drug.
The number of doctors is normalized to one and the doctor has full information
regarding the existence and effectiveness of all the available brands in the market.lO
Once a consumer visits the doctor, the doctor can prescribe any of the available
r7 brands. It is assumed that the doctor prescribes each brand of medicine with an
equal and exogenously given probability, a, (0 < a < 1).
Let firm a randomly sends ot,, (i 
-- 
1,2,...,1; where 1S 4) advertisements to
consumers. Then with probability Ba a consumer receives at least one advertisement
from firm i. Following Butters'(1977) advertising model, if firm i send aa fliers to
consumers, then the probability that a consumer receives no advertisement from firm
i is given by
(1- llN)"t x 
"-oi/N
since N is assumed to be a very large number. So it follows that,
Cn: 1 - e-onlN-i: I,2,...1;I
Each firm's advertising decisions are made in 2 stages. In Stage d all the firms si-
multaneously decide whether to advertise to consumers or not. At the end of. Stage I,
9lnstead, it can be assumed that
consumers have more confidence
lolt is assumed that the doctor
the drug-companies.
some consumers know more about pharmacy than others, so these
to react to a particular advertisement positively.
is honest and cannot be influenced by persuasive advertising from
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the firms observe each-others' decisions . In Stage { firms play a Cournot style simul-
taneous move game to choose DTCA quantity. The game is solved using backward
induction.
The focus of the theoretical analysis will be to find out the relationship between
DTCA and the number of advertising rivals in the second stage given the different
strategy choices made by firms in Stage I. It will be possible to empirically test
the theoretical hypothesis which relates competition and advertising. The study
then finds out the equilibrium number of firms that advertise to consumers. The
equilibrium concept in SPNE.
Under the assumptions made above, any firm i has two channels to earn profit:
(1) The insistent patients who received advertisement(s) from only firm i and
not from any other firm make the doctor prescribe brand i and thus affect
market share of firm i. This is the "market stealing" effect of DTCA.
(2) All the non-insistent patients who received advertisement (s) and those in-
sistent patients who received advertisements from more than one firm seek
doctor's opinion. If the disease is diagnosed then doctor prescribes medicine
i with probability a.
The above analysis explains that any consumer who received an advertisement
visits the doctor. But what happens to those consumers who did not receive an
advertisement? If the symptom/disease is such that the patients ex-ante do not
realize that they should visit the doctor, then all those patients who did not receive
any advertisement do not visit the doctor. In this case, if these potential patients
received advertisements they could increase market size for all brands. However, if
the disease is such that the consumers know that they should visit the doctor anyway,
then DTCA loses its "market expansion effect". In that case, the only way a firm can
benefit from DTCA is when an insistent patient receives advertisement(s) from only
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a particular firm. So, the benefits of using DTCA depend on two factors: a market
characteristic given by / which is same for all classes of drugs, and an "awareness"
factor which varies across classes of drugs. Later four different cases combining all
possible extreme values of @ and "awareness" will be discussed.
For now, the focus is on two broad cases:
o Case.L Where no consurner visits the doctor unless he receives one adver-
tisement. When Q:0, then this case represents only the "market expansion
effect" of DTCA.
o Case 1/. Where all consumers would visit the doctor in spite of not receiving
any advertisement from any firm. This scenario represents only the "market-
stealing" effect of DTCA.
The next sub-section analyzes Stage II of the two-stage game (to be solved by
backward induction) and proves the negative association between consumer advertis-
ing and the number of advertising rivals for both Case I and Case II. In the following
sub-section, SPNE equilibrium analysis will determine equilibrium number of adver-
tising firms.
3.1-. Relationship Between Advertising and Advertising Rivals. Firms
can gain from advertising in two ways. When non-insistent patients previously un-
aware of treatment now visit the doctor because of receiving an advertisement, or
when insistent patients who received advertisements from more than a singe firm
visit the doctor. In these cases, each firm in the market expects revenue depending
on the doctor's prescribing probability. The second way of gaining from advertising is
when an insistent patient receives advertisement (s) from a single firm and visits the
doctor insisting for this particular brand. This results in an increased market share
for the advertising firm. The following analysis (Stage II of the game is analyzed first
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using backward induction) reveals how marginal benefit of advertising goes down as
one more rival starts advertising.
3.1.1. Case l: Consumers do not ui,sit the doctor unless theg rece'iue an aduert'ise-
ment. In this section it is assumed that the total market is made up of those insistent
and non-insistent patients who received at least one advertisement from any adver-
tising firm. That is, DTCA retains both informative and market-stealing qualities.
Under this assumption, the expected profit of firm k, for any k : I,2,...I when 1
firms are advertising to consumers and (n 
- 
I) firms are not can be written as,
II
Eltr1,(o1,)l : N pla11 
- 
e-"k/N) II e-or/N + a[/{(r - Ittt - e-"ntN)i:rj+k i--L
III
f| e-"i/N) -fle-"u/N] + (r - d)0 -fle-"n/t'r)ll - o1,C - Fj:t,i*;' i':r i:l
The first part of the profit function, IOO - e-ok/N)fllo:r,o+*e-ou/Nl, represents all
those insistent patients who received advertisement (s) from only firm k and not from
any other firm. Firm k sells to these people with certainty since the doctors is forced
to prescribe drug k.
The next part of the profit function represents all those patients who depend on
the doctor's wisdom onty. [/{(1 -D:*r((l - e-"0/r'r)lIli:r,i+oe-"ilN) - nt, e-"'/N}]
are the insistent patients who received advertisements from more than one firm and
t(1 - dX1 - f|t, e-"i/N)] represents those non-insistent patients who received at least
one advertisement from any firm. Recall that in this case) consumers do not visit the
doctor unless they receive an advertisement. Interestingly, the total number of firms
in the market 4, does not enter the profit function unless all the firms in the market
advertise.
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F.O.C. for profit maximization impliesll,
IIIr\
{d(1 - o) + a} fle-"n/N + 6a f ttt - e-on/N) II "-"i/N} : ii:L i:r,i*k j:r,j+j
To proceed further analytically, we keep our focus on a symmetric equilibrium
only. For a symmetric equilibrium we can write,
O1 
-O2: :O1r: -O7:O
Hence, the F.O.C. now implies,
(1) k-'/*l'{d*a-gal}+4o(I -7)le-"/N1e-', :2P
Due to analytical complexity, it is not possible to solve for o explicitly from
equation (1). In 3.1.5, equation (1) will be discussed again to provide sufficient
condition and numerical analysis for showing a negative association between a and
1. For now, a special case of (1) is discussed in the following subsection.
3.L.2. Spec'ial case when S:0: Aduert'isi,ng has only market-si,ze effect Equation
(1) now becomes,
r^-o/N1I 
- 
C
Le l:oP
After taking log on both sides and simplifying we get,
o 1,,
,: iltoSP+loga-logC]
Differentiating o with respect to I in this equation we can conclude,
115.O.C. satisfied as well
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do
aI tu
Proposition 1-: Suppose Q : 0 and pati,ents haue no awareness er-ante about
ui,siting the doctor. Then for any I S n, *fu < 0. That 'is, when aduert'ising has only
market-size effect, aduertis'ing by any indi,uidual firm decreases wi,th'increased cornpe-
ti,ti,on from other aduerti,sers.
When advertising has only market expansion effect firms can free-ride on rivals'
advertising and hence, marginal benefit of advertising goes down. As more rivals
advertise, more patients (all non-insistent) visit the doctor and depending on the
doctor's prescribing decisions each firm earns revenue. Thus, even if one firm does
not advertise itself, it can earn same profit without spending on advertising if more
of its rival firms are advertising.
3.1.3. Welfare Analys'is: Onlg Market-Si,ze Effect. If a social planner chooses op-
timal advertising (a) to maximize social welfare, his goal is to maximize the total
number of potential patients who receive prescriptions from the doctor. So the social
planner maximizes the following social welfare function:
sw(a)
Solving the F.O.C. for welfare maximization the socially optimum amount of ad-
vertising is obtained as,
o 
- 
Nflog P + Iog a+ log n - logO]
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In Section 2.L.2 profit maximizing level of advertising by each individual firm was
obtained as,
o 1,,
,:7[tosP+logo-logC]
Thus, total market advertising by / symmetric profit-maximizing firms can be
written as d,
6.: [logP+loga-logC]
Thus it is shown that 6 < o. That is, profit maximization by individual firms
does not reach the socially optimum level of advertisements in the market when ad-
vertising has only market-size effect. Also, it should be noted here that individual
profit maximization is inefficient because each firm incurs the fixed cost of advertising
participation F individually where as in the social planner case the planner pays F
only once. Thus social welfare will increase if a central authority took the responsibil-
ity of making consumers aware of treatments and DTCA was banned for individual
brands.
3.1.4. Case II: Consumers u'isit doctorirrespect'iue of recei,uing any aduertisement.
In this section it is assumed that the total market-size (the number of potential
patients who visit the doctor) is constant and equals N consumers. That is, l/
patients always visit the doctor even if they did not receive any advertisement. Under
this assumption DTCA has only the "market stealing effect". A firm benefits from
DTCA only when an insistent-consumer receives advertisements from only this firm
and from no other firm. Expected profit of firm k, for any k: \,2,...,1 when 1 firms
are advertising to consumers is given by,
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Eltr1"(o1,)l : N pl67 
- 
e-"k/N) II e-ot/N + alg(t- Iffr - e-o,/N)i:r.i*k i:r
fl e-"i/N) + (1 - d)]l - o1"C - Fj:r,i+i
ldG - e-ok/N)lll':r,n+re-"n/Nl represents all those insistent patients who received
at least one advertisement from firm k and no other advertisement from any other
firm. [/(1 - ttr((t - e-"nlN)lIli:r,i*oe-"i/N)] are those insistent patients who re-
ceived advertisements from more than one firm and those who received no advertise-
ment from any firm. Finally, (1 
- d) are all the non-insistent patients who visit the
doctor irrespective of receiving any advertisement.
F.O.C. for profit maximization impliesl2,
IIIrl
{d0 - 
")i ll e-"u/N + da D tf t - e-oo/N) II "-"1/N1 : Yi:7 i:r,i*k j:r,j+i
To proceed further analytically, we keep our focus on a symmetric equilibrium
only. For a symmetric equilibrium we can write,
Oi:O2: :O-1r: 
-O7:O
Hence, the F.O.C. now implies,
(2) le--otyt(l - c,I) * a(I - r)1"-"/N1 (r-r) 
- 
IP6
12S.O.C. for profit maximization also satisfied
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When advertising has only market stealing effect, marginal benefit of advertising
for a firm decreases as more rivals advertise for two reasons:
o It becomes more difficult that an insistent patient receives advertisement
from only this firm and from no other firm.
o An insistent patient who previously received advertisement from only one
rival firm can now be "neutraltzed" to see the doctor if he receives adver-
tisement from another advertising rival even if this firm does not advertise
itself.
3.1.5. Relation Between o and I: General Case. Implicit function theorem is
used to determine the relationship between 1 and o from (1) and (2). That gives us
Proposi,t'ion 2. (see Appendix B (1) for proof)
Propositi on2z For ffi I 0, a suffici'ent cond,'it'ion it'gP ) I-e-"/N . This says
that the probabili,ty that a consun'Ler rece'iues an aduerti,sement from any competing
firm i,s greater than the probabi,Ii,ty that a consurrler rece'iues at least one aduert'isement
from a parti,cular firm.
Since our interest is in the directional relationship between .I and o, we also
solve for o in (1) and (2) using different values of 1. Numerical analysis of (t) and
(2) implies that for given values of o, P, N and C, as .I increases, the amount of
advertisement (o) goes down. See Appendix B (2) for details.
The above analysis shows that under both market expansion effect and market
stealing effect, consumer advertising by each firm goes down as more rival firms
advertise. AIso, under the assumptions of the model, the total number of firms in
the industry (4) does not affect the profit levels of firms and their advertising choices
unless all the firms choose to advertise. Later in this paper, the prediction regarding
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the negative association between advertising and the number of advertising rivals will
be empirically tested using U.S. data.
3.1.6. Welfare Analys'is: Only Market-Steali,ng Effect. When advertising has only
market-stealing effect, all patients visit the doctor irrespective of receiving any ad-
vertisement. Thus, socially optimum level of advertisement(a) in that case is zero.
However, from equation (2) it can be said with certainty that profit maximizing level
of advertisement is greater than zero.
Thus, "too much" advertising leads to social waste when advertising has only market-
stealing effect. In this case firms end up in a situation like prisoner's dilemma to reach
a less desirable outcome. Evervone mav benefit if DTCA was banned.
Proposition 3: When aduert'ising has only market-erpand'ing effect, profi,t mar-
imi,zi,ng firms choose less than the soci,ally opti,mum leuel of aduertis'ing. Howeuer, 'in
the case of rnarlcet-steali,ng aduert'isements, too much aduerti,sing causes a decrease'in
soci,al welfare.
3.2. Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium. The next theoretical question is,
what should be the equilibrium number of advertising firms ? It has been already
shown that there is a negative relationship between advertising and the number of
advertisers. But, why a striking variation is observed in DTCA both within and
across therapeutic classes ? In the U.S. most classes of drugs do not have any DTCA
at all. Even in classes where consumer advertising is observed, only some firms engage
in advertising. This section will try to provide explanations for such observed facts.
3.2.1. Case I: Consumers do not ui,si,tthe doctor unless they recei,ue an adaerti,se-
ment. Due to analytical complexity, it not possible to solve for equilibrium in the
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general set up. To get some intuition first we keep our focus on "market expanding"
DTCA. That is, the case when, d:0.
Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium when Q:0
The goal is to find out under what conditions a non-symmetric DTCA
participatiotrl3 1*h.te 1 firms advertise and (4 - 1) firms do not) is a SPNE
of this symmetric, two-stage game.
Without loss of generality it can be assumed that when we say .I firms
advertise, we refer to the first I-firms. That is firm 1, firm 2, ....,firm I ad-
vertise and firm (I+1), firm (I+2),....,firm 4 do not.
When .I firms are advertising, profit of each of those advertising firms(including
the lth firm) in a symmetric equilibrium is,
(3) ng: Nlpa-C{L+ }trosp+rogo-logCl}l - F
Similarly, when .I firms are advertising, profit of each (n 
- 
t) firms who are
not advertising is,
(4)
"?i;-"0":NlPa-Cl
For this participation-choice to be SPNE we need to ensure that the (/ *
1)'h firm has no incentive to start advertising and that the lth firm has no
incentive to stop-advertising.
If the (t + t)th firm now starts advertising, then profit of the (-I + 1)'h firm
13sin"" we only observe non-symmetric DTCA participation and symmetric-non-advertising DTCA
in reality, we keep our main focus on these two kinds of SPNEs. The data which will be used later
consists of classes where only non-symmetric DTCA participation is observed.
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and other advertising firms will be,
1(5) 
"?!irt : NlPa - c{r+ 7f1[tosP+loga -log c]]l - F
(6)
(B)
"?f!rio" < "?!i
Recall that in this set-up, each firm earns zero profit if no one advertises.
Hence, 
"[f\io' : 0 if the (1 - 1) firms are indifferent between advertising
and not-advertising. This is true if,
(7) NlPa-C{r*frtr"sP+logo-logC\)-P<0.
This implies that 
"?f!rio' 
: 0. Given this is true, the lth firm will continue
to advertise if
Comparing (4) and (5) it can be
have any incentive to advertise.
to "not-advertise" .
Now, profit of the lth firm when
advertise is given by,
Thus , (7) and (B) give the necessary conditions
egy choice (I-firms advertise and (rt I) firms
concluded that the (/ + l)tn firm does not
Therefore, the (/ + l)tn firm will continue
it does not advertise but only (I 
- 
1) firms
this non-symmetric strat-
not) to be SPNE of this
"7f!1i0": NlPa-cl
The lth firm will continue to advertise only if its profit when only (I-1) firms
are advertising is less than its profit when I-firms are advertising. That is,
IYIPa 
- 
C{r + }tt"* P +los a _los Ctl - F
for
do
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two-stage game. This is also a unique pure-strategy SPNE. Each firm inter-
nalizes the positive externality resulting from its rival's advertising.
Proposition 4z When Q : 0, under the symmetry assurnpti,on there
erists a un'ique, pure-strategy SPNE where I f,rms aduer-tise to consumers
and (q 
- 
I ) f,rms do not i,f the two necessarA condi,tions gi,uen by (7) and (8)
are sat'isf,ed.
Next, the focus can be shifted to (3) and (4) to compare the profits earned
by the advertising firms to the profit earned by the non-advertising firms in
this unique SPNE. It is clear that the non-advertising firms earn more profit
and become "free-riders" on the advertising firms.la Therefore:
Proposition 5: The SPNE profit leuels for the aduertis'ing and non-
ad,uerti,s'ing f,rms giaen by (S) and (l) guaranty that 
"?ff-"d" > "ti. Thus
the non-adaerti,sing firms become free-r'iders on the aduer-tising firms.
. Sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium when Q : I
Next, the case is considered where DTCA has both market size effect and
market stealing effect. Analytically, conditions for SPNE cannot be derived
in this case. However, it can be said with certainty that when consumers
are "unaware" and all patients are insistent-type, there cannot be a SPNE
where no f,rm aduertises, or only one firm aduert'ises. This is because if no
firm advertises, then profits of all firms are zero (since there is no market).
If only firm 1 advertises, then this firm owns the entire market since all
t-Wh"" d"*tising has only a strong "market size" effect, it can be argued that advertising by the
existing fi.rms lowers barriers to entry by creating the market. Firms should perhaps limit their
marketing to keep barriers to entry high and prevent free-riding.
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consumers are insistent. Once firm 2 starts advertising then some confused
insistent patients are created who rely on the doctor's decision and other
patients are either prescribed medicine 1 or medicine 2 because they received
advertisement(s) from only one single firm. As more firms advertise, more
confused insistent patients are created who depend on the doctor and can
be prescribed any of the 4 medicines. However, nothing can be said with
certainty regarding the possibilities of SPNEs where either all firms advertise,
or not all but more than one fi.rms advertise.
3.2.2. CaseII: Consumers u'isit doctor irrespect'iue of recei,ui,ng any aduert'isement.
In this case, advertising does not have any market size effect, but it is used only to
steal market share from other firms.
. Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium when d : 0
When DTCA has no market-expansion effect, the only benefit of doing
DTCA can come from market-stealing effect. But when Q : 0, that is
there are no insistent patients, DTCA cannot have any market-stealing effect.
Hence, the only possible unique SPNE is that no firm engages in DTCA.
Proposition 6: When d :0 and pat'ients haue full "awareness" regard-
i.ng ui,si,ti,ng the doctor, the uni,que SPNE 'fu oi:0, Y'i: L,2,..,r1.
Sub-game Perfect Nash equilibrium wherr 0 -- 7
It can be said with certainty that it is not possi,ble to haue a SPNE where
no firm aduert'ises to consumers because if firm 1 starts advertising it can
definitely steal market share. However, it cannot be predicted with certainty,
how many firms will advertise in SPNE. Firms will face a prisoner's dilemma
situation and are likelv to end up in an undesirable outcome.
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3.3. Summary of Theoretical Findings. Theoretical analysis shown above
proves that when Q: I, it is not possible to have a SPNE where no firm advertises to
consumers irrespective of the level of "awareness". However, in the U.S. we observe
most therapeutic classes with no DTCA. Therefore, if the theory is true then value
of / should not be very high in this country. In fact, the value of @ must be rather
low since it has been already shown that when 4 : 0, it is possible to have both
a non-symmetric DTCA SPNE (for the "una\ry'are" diseases) and a symmetric non-
advertising SPNE ("aware" diseases) as observed in this country.
A simple welfare analysis shows that consumer advertising fails to maximize social
welfare when advertising is done for unfamiliar diseases. When consumers already
know about a disease or treatment possibility DTCA is nothing but a social waste.
Furthermore, it was also shown that the amount of DTCA is affected by compe-
tition from other advertising rivals. In a non-symmetric DTCA participation where
I <-rl, equilibrium quantity of DTCA is not affected by total number of competitors
in the marketl5. Section 2 obtained a negative relationship between amount of DTCA
chosen by a firm and the number of advertising rivals. This negative association also
holds in separate cases where DTCA has either market-expanding effects or market-
stealing effects. The following section is going to test this theoretical prediction using
U.S. data.
4. Empirical Evidence
The empirical goal is to test the following hypothesis:
l5Totul number of firms in the market can affect DTCA only through doctor's prescribing probability.
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Hypothesisz Brand-name prescript'ion drugs spend less on own-brand DTCA
the number of competi,ng brands doi,ng DTCA increases.
4.1. Model Specifications. Direct-to-consumer-advertising is modeled as a cen-
sored regression model (Tobit) to explain DTCA expenditures as a function of adver-
tising rivals:
(e) Uit-rn/*un
(10) !a1: rnar{0,air}
where giris a latent variable and not observed. Instead, gr;1 is observed, which is the
DTCA expenditure of product i at time t.
The term u;; r€pres€nts the key explanatory variable, number of advertising ri-
vals, and a set of control variables. These include the age of the drug, a dummy
variable indicating whether a generic enters the market in next 5 years and another
dummy variable indicating whether the drug is marketed by a leading pharmaceutical
manufacturer.
The variable Generi,c is included because the literature suggests that near patent
expiry date brands change their advertising behavior. Accurate data for patent expiry
is hard to get, so entry of a generic drug in near future should capture the effect of
proximity to patent expiry date16. The dummy variable Manufacturer is included
*I" 
"". 
d"t. set no brand-name drug has a generic available in the market between 1996 and 1999.
Hence we need not worry about any possible endogeneity regarding generic entry. The variable
Generic only captures whether the drug is close to its patent expiry date.
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because it is suggested that the pharmaceutical g'iants spend much more on DTCA
than the rest. Finally, the Age variable is included because previous empirical works
suggest that newer drugs are advertised more even though theoretical predictions
relating advertising and age is not unambiguous.
The term za1 is the error component and is expected to contain unobservables like
price, marginal cost of advertising and production, percentage of insistent people in
the population, doctor's preference for the drug, number of patients etc.
The theoretical analysis establishes that advertising (o) and number of advertisers
(/) are both determined within the model and they are negatively related. Hence, all
the parameters of the theoretical models are expected to affect both advertising choice
and the number of advertisers. Some examples of such parameters are the price of
the drugs, marginal costs of advertising and production, doctor's probability of pre-
scribing each drug, market size for a disease, percentage of "insistent patients" in the
population etc. Thus it can be concluded that the key explanatory variable, "numbet
of advertising rivals" is endogenous. Since the goal is to establish a causal relationship
between advertising and the number of competing advertisers, instrumental variable
(IV) is used to deal with this endogeneity.
Two instrumental variables are used. First one is a variable "Top Manufacturer"
which stands for the number of competitors marketed by one of the leading 5 phar-
maceutical manufacturers. The more is the number of competing brands that are
manufactured by a leading corporation, the more of them are likely to engage in
DTCA. Hence, the number of competing brands introduced by the top pharmaceuti-
cals is likely to be correlated with the number of competing advertisers, but unlikely
to be correlated with anv of the unobservables.
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The second IV that is used for the endogenous regressor is called "Time" and
represents "the time since entry of the first drug in a therapeutic class". It is pre-
determined when a breakthrough drug is invented. But once a breakthrough drug
is invented, a market is created for such therapeutic class of drugs. For example,
when Prozac was introduced it was the first antidepressant of its kind. With passage
of time other manufactures learned the know-how and more of "me too" drugs, or
brand-name drugs that compete with Prozac in the same therapeutic category were
introduced.
Hence, the more time passes after the introduction of one breakthrough drug, more
competing brands enter the same market and more of them can engage in consumer
advertising. Therefore, our instrumental variable "time since entry of the first drug
in a class" can be assumed to be correlated with "number of advertising rivals". Also,
it is reasonable to assume that the instrument is uncorrelated with any unobservable
(error) that affects "how much a firm advertises today".
Recent literature has widely discussed the problems caused by weak instruments.
Hence the relevance of the two instruments are examined. The first stage F-statistic
of the IVs is 39.72, which is much higher than 10, the minimum acceptable F-statistics
proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997). The r32 in the first stage regression is 0.47 for
a total of 101 observations. Therefore, it is concluded that the instruments are not
weak.
The final empirical model is thus a Tobit model with IV which uses DZC,A as
the dependent variable, Aduert'ising Ri,aals as the endogenous explanatory variable,
Time and Top Manufacturer as the excluded instruments, and Age, Generic and
Manufacturer as the exogenous explanatory variables.
4.2. Description of the Data. The hypothesis is tested using a micro data
compiled from several sources described below. The data set contains a total of
set
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drug-year observations for 29 brand-name drugs over the period 1996-1999. These
drugs belong to one of the following five therapeutic classes: Rx-Statins, SSRI/SNRI,
Proton Pump Inhibitors, Antihistamines and HlV-Reverse Transcriptive InhibitorslT.
Drug Facts and Comparisons, a standard medical reference, was consulted to find
out different therapeutic classes and drugs that belong to each of those classes. The
manufacturer's name and information on existence of any generic substitute for each
brand was also obtained from the same source.
DTCA expenditure for each brand-name drug was obtained from TNS Media
Intelligence/Competitive Media Reporting (CMR). CMR monitors advertising units
and expenditures for several different media, including cable TV, network TV, news-
papers and magazines for all brand-name products. All advertisements for prescrip-
tion drugs that appeared in these media are included in CMR database handbook
AD$Summary18.
FDA's Orange Book was consulted to find out approval date for each brand. Age
of drug was calculated as the year since FDA approval. FDA's drug information was
used to find out information on generic-entry of each drug and year of generic entry
was obtained where applicable.
Ra,nking of pharmaceutical manufacturers by U.S. sales was obtained from IMS
Healthle. AII the variables used in this paper and their sources are listed in Table 1.
Table 2 shows the leading 10 pharmaceutical corporations by U.S. sales in 2000.
The ranking was almost identical during the previous years. Table 3 presents the
lTsince the goal is to find the effect on DTCA of the number of advertising competitors, those classes
of drugs were chosen where at least some brands with positive DTCA amount are observed.
18CMR reports ad-expenditures only if total annual expenditure is $25,000 or more. However, it is
reasonable to assume that no brand-name prescription drug spends on DTCA a positive amount,
but Iess than this annual cut-off value.
19See Table 2 for details. Source: IMS Health, Retail and Provider PerspectiveTM,200I
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Tnet,n 1. Description of Variables and Sources
Variable Description Source
DTCA
Age
Generic
Advertising-
Rivals
Manufacturer
Time
Annual total DTCA dollars($1000)
Years since FDA approval
Dummy 
- 
1 if generic entered the
market within 5 years; 0 otherwise
Number of rivals engaged in DTCA
Dummy 
-1 if brand is marketed by
Ieading 5 manufacturers; 0 otherwise
Time since approval of the first drug in a class
CMR
FDA Orange Book
FDA, Drug Facts
and Comparisons
CMR, Drug Facts
and Comparisons
FDA, IMS Health
FDA
summary statistics. Notice that the annual DTCA expenditure varies from
lhan 77 million dollars. There are 58 observations in the data set with a
for DTCA. The Appendix B (2) provides Appendix Tables 1 and 2 that
the additional details regarding the data.
Teet,p 2. Leading 10 Corporations by Il.S. Sales, 2000
Corporations U.S. Sales $
(U S $Millions)
0 to more
zero value
report all
Pfizer lW-L
GW/SK
Merck
Bristol-Myers Squibb
AstraZeneca Corp
Johnson k Johnson
Pharmacia Corp
Lilly
American Home Prod
Schering Plough
15,341 . 1
12 ,980.5
L0,790.2
8,999.4
8,552.2
7,896.7
6,276.8
6,133.2
6,023.r
5,773.4
Source: IMS Health, Retail and Provider
PerspectiveT M,2001
4.3. Regression Results.
sion are reported in Table 4.
Results from the instrumental variable Tobit regres-
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Tast,p 3. Summary Statistic
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
DTCA*
Advertising-
Rivals
Time
Age
9946.3
2.2
9.2
4.3
19980.5
1.3
2.9
3.3
77303.6
5
12
T2
105
105
105
105
0
0
1
0
*in ($1000)
TaeLn 4. Instrumental Variable Tobit Regression
Dependent Variable: DTCA
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Advertising Rivals
Rivals
Generic
Manufacturer
Age
constant
Observations
-13 ,4r2*x -18 ,299. 13** -12,755.2**(4,543) (6 ,75e) (4,736)
969
(r4,73r)
Lg,926**
(7,538)
-12
(1,499)
13,630
(11 ,295)
105
-7377
(r7,440)
20,gg8**
(7,e53)
582
(1,666)
22,288
(r4,594)
105
2394
(14,962)
20,054**
(7,650)
-L2T
(7,522)
11 
,B4B
(11 ,775)
105
-6,788**
(2,525)
4,166
(15,260)
22,935**
(B,2og)
-r57
(r,577)
17,333
(13,401)
105
Excluded
Instruments:
Time, Top-
Manufac-
turer
Top- Time
Manufac-
turer
Time
Standard errors in parentheses;
*x significant at 7 To
The results are in line with the prediction of the theoretical model. In the first
regression (1), the co-efficient for the number of advertising rivals is negative and
significant providing support for the hypothesis that brand-name prescription drugs
tend to spend less on own-brand DTCA as the number of competing brands doing
DTCA increases. The value of the co-efficient turns out to be 30.6% of the annual
DTCA expenditure of advertising firms (the minimum that is considered is 1 million
5d
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dollars). This seems to be a reasonable value of the coefficient. The coefficients for
Age variable and Generic variable are both insignificant. However, the result suggests
that the drugs marketed by one of the top 5 pharmaceutical companies are likely to
be advertised more to consumers. Regressions (2) and (3) use only one excluded
instrument, Time and Top Manufacturer respectively. Results from the first three
columns are almost identical.
Iizuka (2004) showed that the number of brand name drugs in each therapeutic
class has a negative and significant effect on advertising. That is, on average, firms
reduce DTCA as the number of brand-name competitors increases within each ther-
apeutic class. Hence, he concluded that advertising decreases with competition.
The goal of this paper was to test the effect of competition on advertising as well.
However, the crucial difference is that here competition is defined as the number of
competitors in a therapeutic class who advertise themselves. In other words, the the-
ory suggests that advertising should decrease in the number of advertisers irrespective
of the total number of competitors in the market.
To compare the results of this paper with those from Iizuka (2004) the last re-
gression (4) uses the total number of rivals as the endogenous explanatory variable
instead of only those rivals who advertise. Regression (4) uses only "Time" as the in-
strumental variable. The coefficient on the number of advertising rivals is more than
two times larger than the coefficient on the number of rivals. Thus, if cornpeti,tion ts
defined by total number of competitors in the market then the effect of competition
is much small on DTCA than the effect of competition captured by those rivals who
advertise themselves.
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5. Conclusion
The main goal of this paper was to analyze different aspects of consumer-advertising
in specialized markets. Even though consumer-advertising of prescription drugs is
considered to be a highly controversial marketing strategy, it is shown here that it
can be perfectly rational for the firms to engage in DTCA even when their competitors
equally benefit from their advertising efforts.
In light of the features most closely associated with the prescription drugs market,
the theoretical analysis establishes a strong and negative effect of the number of com-
peting advertisers on a firm's advertising decisions. The negative association between
the number of advertising rivals and the amount of advertising was established in
separate cases of "market expanding" and "market stealing" advertisements.
The theoretical analysis also provides new economic insights regarding why only
some firms in a market may choose to advertise to consumers while others become free-
riders on them. Explanation has been offered for the observed advertising behavior
by the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. The theory suggests that the drugs treating
diseases which are very familiar to the consumers do not advertise to consumers at all.
However, for drugs that treat very unfamiliar diseases, a non-symmetric advertising
participation can be observed.
A simple welfare analysis shows that in case of market-expanding DTCA, firms
choose less than the socially optimum level of advertising. But in case of market-
stealing advertising, there is too much DTCA.
Even though this paper closely follows the features of the prescription drugs mar-
ket, the basic structure is same for any specialized markets like the travel, real-estate
and contractor. The manufacturers in all specialized markets need to decide why
and how much should they advertise to consumers even when lhe erperts are fully
informed about their products. The introduction of "insistent patients" in the model
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makes it more applicable to other specialized markets because consumers have more
power to influence the experts' decisions in markets like travel, real-estate etc. Thus
the theoretical implications should hold very closely for the other forms of expert
markets especially when the consumers in those markets face a high search cost.
The empirical results are in line with the theoretical predictions and confirm a neg-
ative relationship between advertising expenditure and the number of advertising ri-
vals. No study has previously investigated how the number of advertising-competitors
affects advertising decisions independent of the total number of rivals in the market.
That is why, number of rivals has always been the measure of competition in pre-
vious studies. However, this paper argues that in specialized markets a significant
determinant of consumer advertising is the number of competing advertisers. While
making advertising choices, firms should take into account how many of their rivals
are advertising rather than concentrating on the total number of available brands.
Research on consumer advertising in specialized markets is scarce. Having models
where firms choose both expert and consumer advertising endogenously can generate
further economic insights. Also, a dynamic, multi-period advertising decision can
be studied to infer on whether advertising should increase or decrease over time.
This paper itself can generate other testable empirical hypothesis which could not be
performed due to data constraints. Finally, a model of consumer advertising under
a different legal setting can be very useful to understand why most countries do not
allow DTCA of prescription drugs. All these research ideas and more belong to the
future research agenda.
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CHAPTER 3
Direct-to-Consumer-Advertising of Prescription Drugs:
Introducing Asymmetry in Disease-Familiarity and
Market-Share
Abstract
The third chapter introduces variation in disease-familiarity in a multiple-firm
model of consumer-advertising in specialized markets and comparative static anal-
ysis shows that direct-to-consumer-advertising is a decreasing function of disease-
familiarity. Also, asymmetry at the firm Ievel is introduced in a two-firm setting to
show that the firm with a higher market-share advertises more to consumers. Nu-
merical analysis is used to establish the positive association between advertising and
market-share.
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1. Introduction
As a type of product or service becomes increasingly familiar, should the manu-
facturers advertise more or less? It could be true that as the consumers become more
aware of a particular type of product, the manufacturers increase their advertising to
generate brand-loyalty. But intuitively it is also possible that as the consumers be-
come more knowledgeable about the existence of a group of products, manufacturers
tend to reduce their advertising since a market has already been created. One of the
goals of this chapter is to study the effect of product familiarity on advertising when
advertising could be used for both market-expanding and market-stealing.
More specifically, the aim of this chapter is to analyze whether direct-to-consumer-
advertising (DTCA) in the prescription drugs market is used more-extensively or
less-extensively for drugs that are used to treat more-familiar versus less-familiar dis-
eases. This requires the introduction of variability in disease-familiarity in the models
used in the previous chapters.
The other objective of this paper is to introduce asymmetry at the firm-level in
the models used earlier and find out if the brands with higher market share (ex-ante)
should advertise more or less than the brands with lower market share. Common
intuition in not conclusive. For example, Ieading brands of prescription drugs might
know that the doctors will prescribe their brands with a higher probability and so
they may choose not to spend a lot on advertising to consumers, whereas brands with
a smaller market share (ranked lower in doctor's preference) might choose to advertise
more to consumers to influence a doctor's choice of medicine. On the other hand, if
an important role of advertising is to create a market, the firms with higher market
share might advertise more since they will benefit more due to increased market size.
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Direct-to-consumer-advertising (DTCA) of prescription drugs is a fairly new phe-
nomenon in the U.S. Until 20 years ago, physician advertisements in the forms of
sampling, detailing and medical journal entries were the traditional ways of advertis-
ing prescription drugs. In recent years, however, drug companies have increased their
advertisement budget to acquaint American consumers with diseases like depression,
erectile dysfunction, acid reflux disease, and toenail fungus, etc. After the relaxation
of advertising restrictions on the broadcast media by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) in August L997, direct-to-consumer-advertising (DTCA) expenditure by
U.S. pharmaceutical companies has skyrocketed. DTCA spending has increased both
in absolute terms and as a percentage of total promotional spending. The average
annual growth rate in DTCA was 33 percent between 1996 and 2000, compared to
a 14 percent growth rate for total promotional spending during the same period. In
2001, spending for DTCA ($2.7 billion) comprised 15 percent of total promotional
spending, up from 8 percent ($S00 million) in 1996t. Even though DTCA has grown
disproportionately compared to other forms of drug promotion over the last decade,
physicians still remain the primary focus of marketing efforts (85 percent of total
promotional spending)2.
The U.S. pharmaceutical companies have universally accepted the strategy of
marketing prescription drugs to physicians. However, they differ significantly in their
practice when it comes to promoting prescription drugs directly to consumers:
o Consumer advertising of prescription drugs is limited to very few therapeutic
classes.
ffiYorkTimesarticle(August3,2005:DrugMakerstoPolice
reports that spending on DTCA in 2004 was 4 billion dollars
2 rourr", Prescription Drugs Trends, a chartbook update by Kaiser Family
200r.
Consumer Campaigns)
Foundation, November
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. Even within a class of drugs there exists significant variation in DTCA par-
ticipation.
There are a few consumer-survey findings that are interesting as well. The most
widely cited set of surveys are those conducted yearly by Preaent'ion magazine. The
1997 survey finds that 29% of consumers asked for a particular prescription from their
doctor after viewing an advertisement for that drug and 73% of those consumers got
what they requested.
This provides some support for the view that even if patients cannot write their own
prescriptions, they try to influence their doctor's decision. It should be noted, how-
ever, that there is no information available in these surveys on whether the doctor
was going to prescribe that particular brand anyway or whether he did it due to the
pressure from the patient.
Theoretical results in this paper suggest that with increased a$/areness about
the existence and treatment possibilities of a disease, direct-to-consumer-advertising
goes down. A multi-firm analysis shows that brand-name drugs belonging to those
therapeutic classes which treat very familiar diseases tend to advertise much less to
consumers than drugs that are used for very unfamiliar diseases.
Using a separate two-firm model it is also shown that in the prescription drugs
market the brand which has a higher market share (in percentage terms) advertises
more to consumers. This is due to the public-good aspect of DTCA. When a firm
advertises to bring more people to the doctor and thus increase the market-size, all
the brands that the doctor might prescribe can expect potential gain in profit. Thus
the brand which is more preferred by the doctor can gain relatively more from an
increased market size and hence has more incentive to advertise.
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The following section summarizes the related literature. Section 3 introduces the
model set-uo. Section 4 and Section 5 illustrates the results and Section 6 concludes.
2. Existing Literature
Economic studies of advertising of prescription drugs to physicians by Bond and
Lean (L977), Hurwitz and Caves (1988), Leffer (1981), and Vernon (1981) suggested
that this marketing was more "persuasive" than "informative" in nature, although
the distinction between the two was not unambiguous. There is literature on adver-
tising that assumes that advertising changes consumer preferences (Kaldor 1950), or
advertising that informs consumers about the existence and price of a product (But-
ters 1977), or advertising that informs consumers about product characteristics and
price (Stigler 1961). The closest theoretical study to this paper, a paper that studies
DTCA, is by Rubin and Schrag (1999) who showed that a monopolist seller of pre-
scription drugs could use DTCA to influence the HMO's preference for cheaper drugs
for its patients. Of course, the objective and setting of this paper is very different
from Rubin and Schrag.3 Also, a marketing paper by Ritzes and Clyde (1999) finds
that when marketing has only spillover effects, firms might want to reduce advertis-
ing to increase barriers to entry. This result comes from the public good aspect of
advertising in markets where there exists marketing spillovers. More advertising by
one firm creates the market and thus makes it easier for other competitors to enter.
Empirical papers have studied demand aspects of DTCA of prescription drugs
using U.S. data. For example, Berndt et al (1995), Iizuka and Jin (2003), Wosinska
(2002), Rosenthal et al (2003) to name a few. These papers find that DTCA increases
market size for an entire class, but it has no significant impact on market share within
3A companion paper of this paper, "Advertising in Specialized Markets: Example from the U.S.
Pharmaceutical Industry", analyzes the existence of sub-game perfect Nash Equilibriums in a two.
firm setting in light of the prescription drugs market and finds conditions for SPNEs.
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a class. On the supply side Iizuka (2004) finds out that drugs that are new, for under
treated diseases and are of high quality are more likely to be advertised to consumers.
Iizuka (2004) also finds that with increased competition from other firms, consumer
advertising decreases.
3. Theoretical Set Up
There are three different groups of agents in the model. Firms who sell brand-
name prescription drugs, potenti,al pat'ients (consumers)who want to purchase those
medications and doctors who write prescriptions for the patients. Each firm decides
how much to advertise to consumers. The advertising firms then send out adver-
tisements randomly to consumers and each consumer rnaA receive advertisements
from one or more firms. The patients then see the doctors. The doctors make their
prescribing decisions based on their conversation with the patients and their prior
knowledge of each drug. Once a patient gets a prescription, he purchases the drug.
On the supply side, there are 4 oligopolistic firms selling brand-name drugs that
belong to the same therapeutic class. A firm makes profit only if a patient is pre-
scribed its brand by the doctor. All firms can advertise to consumers. Marginal cost
of advertising to consumers is C (C > 0), assumed identical for all firms. Marginal
cost of production is normalized to zero.
The goal of this paper is not to find out the equilibrium number of firms that
advertise to consumers. In the last chapter it was already shown how the equilibrium
number of advertising firms is determined. Instead, the goal here is to find out given
the equilibrium number of advertising firms, how the advertising amount changes
with different degrees of disease familiarity and heterogeneity in market-share.
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Firms who advertise to consumers randomly send out fliers which contain infor-
mation on what disease/symptoms the drug is used to treat and how effective the
drug is for treatment.
To distinguish between a firm's participation decision and the firm's decision of how
much to advertise the following simple assumption is introduced . If a firm chooses
to advertise to consumers, it has to incur a small fixed cost F which would not exist
otherwise. It can be thought of as a regulatory requirement. For example, the FDA
requires that if a company advertises to consumers, it has to put up a website on
the internet that gives information on the drug's effectiveness and major side effects.
The companies who do not engage in consumer advertising do not have to have a
website. But any firm that does consumer advertising must comply to this regulation
irrespective of how much advertising it does.
The amount of doctor advertising by a firm is exogenous and normalized to zero.4
There are ly' consumers in the market and l/ is assumed to be very large. Each
consumer has unit demand. To focus on firms' advertising decisions, demand is as-
sumed to be perfectly price-inelastic. This ensures that firms do not compete over
4In a co*panion paper, it was shown that even when doctor advertising is persuasive, it does not
have any trade off with consumer advertising. The same intuition will hold in this set up. In this
paper the focus is on consumer advertising only.
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price.s In the entire analysis it is implicitly assumed that there are no over-the-
counter medicines available for treating the same disease. This guaranties that once
a consumer is aware of a disease, he has to visit the doctor. We also assume that
there are no generic substitute drugs available for these brand-name drugs.
Even though a patient cannot write his own prescription, he can, however, in-
fluence a doctor's decision for obtaining a particular brand of drug. There is an
exogenously given probability Q that a consumer is "insistent type". An insistent
person is easily impressed by an advertisement and insists that the doctor prescribes
that brand of drug6. If a doctor encounters an insistent person, he prescribes what
the insistent person wants. In case an insistent person receives advertisement from
more than one firm, then he is confused and relies entirely on the doctor's decision.
A non-insistent person always relies on the doctor's wisdom. No patient is ex-ante
aware of the existence and effectiveness of any brand of drug.
There is an exogenously given probability 0 that a consumer is ex-ante aware of
the existence of a particular treatment option. That is, with probability 0 a consumer
knows that if he has a particular symptom, he needs to see the doctor. d represents
5It is widely accepted that demand is price inelastic for brand name prescription drugs. These drugs
are a necessity to a patient, there are not many substitutes available and the effective price that
an insured consumer has to pay is small. Prescription coverage by insurance companies has been
steadily increasing shifting the burden of drug expenditures away from consumers to private and
government insurance programs.
Source: Prescription Drugs Ttends, a chart book update by Kaiser Family Foundation, November
200t.
It is assumed that the demand is price inelastic between [0, p] and for a price higher than p, demand
drops to zero. It automatically follows from this assumption that each firm will charge the highest
possible price p for which demand is positive. Firms do not compete over price, instead price is
given by market convention. However, price guaranties excess profit margin.
olnstead, it can be assumed that some consumers know more about pharmacy than others, so these
consumers have more confidence to react to a particular advertisement positively.
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awareness about a particular class of drugs, not about a particular brand of drug.
The number of doctors is normalized to one and the doctor has full information
regarding the existence and effectiveness of all the available brands in the market.
Drugs are homogeneous in the sense that doctor ex-ante has an equal preference for
all the available brands in the market.
Once a consumer visits the doctor, the doctor can prescribe any of the available
4 brands. It is assumed that the doctor prescribes each brand of medicine with an
exogenously given probability, a, (0 < a < 1). AIso, there is always some probability
that the doctor might not diagnose the disease and hence does not prescribe any of
the 17 brands to a consumer. Thus, (0 < o < Il I) for all k.
Let firm i randomly send a4, (i, : I,2,...,1; where I < d advertisements to
consumers. Then with probability B; a consumer receives at least one advertisement
from firm i. Following Butters'(1977) advertising model, if firm i send aa fliers to
consumers, then the probability that a consumer receives no advertisement from firm
i is given by
(I-llN)"t 
- 
"-ot/N
since N is assumed to be a very large number. So it follows that,
gt : | 
- 
e-oi/N ;i : L,2,..J; I I 11
Hence, the advertising-firms play a Cournot style simultaneous move game to
choose DTCA quantity.
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4. Relation between Advertising and 0
The expected profit of firm k, for any k :1,2,..1 when 1 (where
determined) firms are advertising to consumers and (4 
- 
.I) firms
written as
Elnr("*)] 
- 
Mtd(1 
-e-or/*)
/ is exogenously
are not can be
I
€-ottN +r[d{(1 
-Ittt -e-ont*)
-1
III
il e-oi/N) - (1 -0)ll e-"u/Nj +(1 - ilG- (1 -p)ff"-",r*1rl-o1,c - Fj:t,i*t' i--r i':7
The first part of the profit function, tOG - e-"n/N)lIlo:r,o+re-"ulNf , represents all
those insistent patients who received advertisement (s) from only firm k and not from
any other firm. Firm k sells to these people with certainty since the doctor is forced
to prescribe drug k.
The next part of the profit function represents all those patients who depend on the
doctor's wisdom only. [/{(1-Dt,((t- e-ou/N)fIli:r,i+n"-",/N1-(7-qnl:re-"u/N}]
are the insistent patients who received advertisements from more than one firm or
insistent patients who were arvr/are of the treatment but did not receive any advertise-
ment.
t(1 - dX1 - (1 - qn{:re-"n/N)] represents those non-insistent patients who re-
ceived at least one advertisement from any firm or those non-insistent patients who
were aware of treatment even if they did not receive any ad from any firm.
I
II
i:l,i*k
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F.O.C. for profit maximization impliesT,
III
{d(1 -a)+a(t -l)}fie-"'/N+Oa I ttt -e-o'/N) II "-"i/r{y:f;i:L i,-_r,i+k j:r,jlj
To proceed further analytically, the focus is on a symmetric equilibrium only. For
a symmetric equilibrium it can be written,
O1 :O2: 
-Oit: -O7:O
Hence, the F.O.C. now implies
(11) l"-"/*l'{Q+ o(1 - 0) - QaI} + do(I - t)le-"/Nyr-:^t : }
4.1. General Case: Implicit F\rnction Theorem. The goal is to obtain a
directional relation between amount of advertising (o) and disease-familiarity (0).
Equation (11) represents F.O.C. for profit maximization in the general case when
both market size effect and market share effect are present. In this case it is possible
to provide a sufficient condition (using Implicit Function Theorem) under which a
and 0 are negatively related.
Implicit Function Theorem:
Let, f (o,0)- k.
Then
, 0fa,o Ta('' t')d0 -T
oo
' S. O . C. satisfied as well.
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#: -fib-"'*l'{o(r - 0) + oG - oI)} - 
"+! [e-'lru1(r-r) . o
Also,
H: -ale-"/Nll <o
Thus, a sufficient condition for ffi < 0 is that (a < LII).
4.2. Only market-size effectz Q:0. Equation (11) now becomes,
le-otN1r:#W
Afber taking the log of both sides and simplifying we get,
o 1.
": 
fllosP+loga*log(1 -0)- logC]
Differentiating o with respect to 0 in this equation yields,
0o
a0 tu
Proposition 1-: Whether aduert'isi,ng has both market-stealing and market-erpandi,ng
effects (O + 0) or only market-erpandi,ng effects (Q:0), # .0.
4. RELATION BETWEEN ADVEHTISING AND O
If L.H.S. of (11) is written as f (o,0), then after partial differentiations it is ob-
tained that, 8
6By our assumption, LII > o always. Even when all the brands advertise and so the doctor
prescribes all the available brands with equal probability, the probability of the outcome that "no
drug is prescribed to the consumer" is always positive. An equivalent condition will be that there
is at Ieast one other brand in the market that the doctor can prescribe which is not advertising to
consumers.
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5. Introducing Asymmetry in Market-Share: Two-Firm Analysis
Now, it is assumed that there are only two firms in the market that are advertising
(I : 2). A doctor prescribes medicine 1 produced by firm 1 with an exogenously
given probability a1 and medicine 2 produced by firm 2 with an exogenously given
probability a2 where ar * az. That is, the doctor has a non-symmetric preference
for both drugs which in turn causes the market-shares to differ between firms.
The expected profits of firms 1 and firm 2 can be written as:
Elnr("t)] 
- 
MIlrQ 
- 
e-o'/N)"-"'lN + rr(1 
- 
e-oLlN e-o'lN *
2de-"tlN e-ozlN 
- 
Qe-o'/N - d"-orlN)] - otC - F
Here /(1 
- 
"-or/N)e-oz/N are insistent patients who received advertisement fron
onlv firm 1. The rest of the patients.
\ _ e-"l/N e-"2/N l2$e-ot/N 
"-or/N 
_ $e-or/w _ Qe-oz/N
depend on the doctor's probability, a1 for obtaining drug 1. These are all those
insistent patients who received advertisements from more than one firm and the non-
insistent patients who received at least one advertisement from any firm.
Following same logic the profit function for firm 2 can be written as,
Elnr(dl: Mldi;- 
- 
e-o2lN)e-o'lN + a2(I 
- 
e-orlN e-o'/N *
2de-o'/N €-ozlN 
- 
Q"-or/N 
- 
Qe-or/N)] 
- 
ozC 
- 
F
77
5. INTRODUCING ASYMMETRy n\r MARKET-SHARE: 'IWO-FIRM
ANALYSIS
Firms, just like before, play a simultaneous move Cournot game to choose profit
maximizing levels of advertising.
The F.O.C.s for profit maximization imply
(r2)
(13)
€-or/n l4"-o2lN +,r{ O + e-oz/* (t zil}l
e-or/*l6"-o2lN + aze-o2l* (t 
- 
2ill + az|e-oz/N
C
P
C
P
(Note: If 0 :0 then the only solution is that er : e2. But since the assumption
is that at I c"z), for our model to be valid we need / I 0. That is, there is always
some market share gain from advertising, however small. If. 4 : 0 then both firms
will not advertise in equilibrium.)
Substituting the values of e-or/N in (13) and solving for e-""/w we obtain after
simplification,
e-o2lN ICG - 2il(*, - e1) + erazPf'l' + 4CPatezf'@ * a1 (1 - 2il)2pd*r@+ al(1 
-2d))
+ -C G - 2il(*, - 01) - atezPf'2pQar(Q + r' (1 
- 
2il)
After taking logs and simplifying,
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ANALYS/.s
(r4)
o2f IY 
- 
Iog2+ log P + log O+ log c.z* log(Q+
'' 
(1 
- 
2il) 
- 
loe[
Similarly, substituting the value of e-o'lN
in (13) and solving for e-or/N yields,
-C 0 - 2il(*, - tr) - atezP|'l
in terms of the parameters of the model
o1f Iv 
- 
Ios (Q + *r(L 
- 
2il)
+ Iog[ ICQ - 2il(o, - *r) * arazPd'l'+ 4CPatezf'@ * a1 (1 - 2il)
-CQ - 20)(*, - rr) - elazP[2l - Iosl2CSar(Q * a1 (1 - 2il)
*CSar(l 
- 
zil@, 
- 
*r) * at(c.z)'PQt 
-
(15)
Qaz
The goal is to see if the brand with a higher market-share advertises more to
consumers or less compared to the other brand. So if the brand which is relatively
preferred by the doctor advertises more, it should be true that
otlN > orlN if ar ) d2 a,nd, otlN < orlN if. ar < az.
Analytical complexity does not allow for further algebraic analysis. So the method
of numerical analysis is used to predict any directional relationship between dL, dz
andolf N,o2f N. Equations (14) and (15) are used for the numerical analysis.
2il(*, or) i atazPf'l' + 4CPatezf'(0 + 01 (1 
- 
2il)
ICQ - 2il(*, - rt) * atazPf'l'+ ACParazQ'@ + a1(1 - 2A))l
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Ftcunr L. P :100, C : 70,0 :0.7,dt: .3
As shown in Appendix C (1), for given values of P and C, there is an obvious
trend that when a1)a2 then o1/l/ > orlN and vice versa. This trend holds true for
different values of /. That is, irrespective of the strength of market-share incentive
for DTCA, the brand with a higher market-share tend to advertise more when there
is a significant market-size incentive for advertising.
Graphical analysis also suggests similar relationship between otlN, o"lN &rd o1, o2.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot otlN 
- 
orlN against a2for given values of P,C, $ and a1.
All three graphs show that when o1 ) o2, then o-',lN 
- 
o2lN > 0.
The numerical analysis suggests that when the value of / is very small (close to 0),
then the optimal amount of advertising for the brand with much lower a is often neg-
ative, thereby reaching corner solution outcomes. This is exactly what was expected
because it was already shown theoretically that when /:Q, unless a1 : 42, both
firms will not advertise in equilibrium. The next step is to check whether the corner
solution outcomes are indeed equilibrium outcomes. For that we do the following
analvsis.
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FtcunB 2. P 
- 
L20,C :20,6 
- 
0.3,e1 : .7
Ftcune 3. P 
- 
I2A.,C : 20, O 
- 
0.3, er : .5
5.1. Corner Solution Analysis. When numerical analysis suggests that profit
maximizing level of o1 10, we assume it to be zero (firms cannot do negative amount
of advertising). Then given firm 1 is not advertising, the optimal amount of adver-
tising of firm 2 (reaction function of firm 2 given firm 1 is advertising zero) can be
obtained from:
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Eltr2(o2)l : N PldG 
- 
"-oz/N1 + 
a2(l 
- ilQ - 
"-oz/N71 - 
ozC 
- 
F
F.O.C. for profit maximization implies
(16) K:rorP+log[/ *a2(L-l)] -logC
For equilibrium analysis we need to check that indeed firm 1 chooses ar ( 0 when
firm2 chooses the advertising level given by (16). Thus
Elnr(or,or)l 
- 
NP! 1-e-o'/N) +ar{(l
'PlO*a2(r-il QCPIO*a2(L-il1
(Q + (1 
- 
2ile-ort*)+ (1 
- ilQ - e-o'lt))l - o1C - F
profit maximtzatton it is possible to obtain the best response
advertising in the amount given by (16) u.,
From the F.O.C.
of firm 1 when firm
for
2is
ftrl 2 : IosldC+ Co1(l -20) + OaLP(6* o2(1 - d))l - log C - los(d+ or(1 - /))1V
Similar analysis holds true when o2 : 0 and firm 1 is the only firm advertising.
Appendix C (2) presents the numerical analysis for the corner solutions. Equations
(16) and (17) are used for the numerical analysis. First, the parameter values(P,C,@)
for which dr ( 0 is obtained in Appendix C (2) is noted. Then using (16) and those
parameter values, the corner solution value of orlN is obtained. Finally, for the same
parameter values it is checked whether orlN as obtained from (17) has a negative
outcome. If yes, then we can confirm that the corner solutions obtained in Appendix 1
are equilibriums.
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Numerical analysis in App.ndix
outcomes are equilibriums.
C (2) indeed suggests that the corner solution
Proposition 2z When there erists asymmetry in doctors' preferences for two
drugs (o, I d2), the brand which is more preferred always adueriises more to con-
sunxers giaen there is a si,gnificant market-erpandi,ng benefit from aduerti'si'ng.
When advertising is mostly used to increase the market-size, the brand that is
relatively preferred by doctors will have a relatively larger increase in profit from an
increased market. That is why it is rational for the preferred firm to bear relatively
more burden of expanding the market. Even when the value of / is large and thus
there is significant potential market-share benefit of advertising, the leading firm
advertises more because it not only gains when an insistent patient (who received
advertisement from only this firm) makes the doctor prescribe the leading brand, but
the leading firm also gains more out of an increased number of "confused insistent
patients" who received advertisement from both firms and hence depend on the doctor
entirely.
6. Conclusion
The first two chapters of the thesis analyze different aspects of direct-to-consumer-
advertising of prescription drugs when firms were symmetric. This chapter relaxes
the symmetry assumption at both the firm-level and the disease-level and generates
testable theoretical hypotheses.
The first part of this chapter introduces a parameter that allows for variability in
the degree of disease-familiarity in a multiple-firm setting. Analytical results show
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that irrespective of whether DTCA has only market-expanding effect or both market-
expanding and market-stealing effects, the level of direct-to-consumer-advertising is
a decreasing function of disease-familiarity.
The second part of this chapter introduces asymmetry at the firm-level in a two-
firm setting. This part allows for doctors' preferences for both drugs to differ ex-
ante. That is, if the patients visited the doctor seeking his opinion for a treatment,
the doctor would prescribe one medicine with a higher probability than the other.
Combination of analytical study and numerical analysis shows that when DTCA has
a significant market-expanding effect, the brand which is more preferred by the doctor
should advertise more (irrespective of the intensity of the market-stealing effect).
In the future with the availability of data, both hypotheses could be empirically
tested. Right now empirical testing of the hypotheses are constrained by unavailability
of reliable data. Future work might analyze multi-period decision-making in the
prescription drugs market where firms and consumers learn from previous experience.
Theoretical study of advertising decisions in a specialized-market set up is scarce and
leaves much room for future research.
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Efur1(O,sr)l : lrot#E(l 
- dX1 - 
"-oz/N1- stca
Therefore, aE[?r1(0' sr)] 
- 
Np, i' , 
'u 
(1 
- 
d)(1 - e-o'/N) - ca:0osr (s1 + s2l"
We also have
Efur2(o2,"r)] : Np2o$ 
- 
e-"'/N) + wpr# 
rr(1 - d)(1 - e-o'lN) - otc"- slca- F
so, ryryP: r/p,G+"#(l 
- 
d)(1 - e-o"/N) - ca:0
Solving for s1 and s2,
APPENDIX A
Appendix to Chapter 1
1. Solution to Model I
1.1. Case I i ot:0,o2: 0.
Elnt(ot, sr )] 
- 
0
Elnr(or, tr)] 
- 
0
L.2. Case II i ot:0,o2 + 0. We have
s1 Pt:
s1 *sz h*Pz
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and
And also,
s2 Pz
s1 *sz Pt*pz
s1 
- ffifio-ile-e-o2t*)
s2: ffifio-d)(1 -e-o2t*)
Putting these values back in the original profit functions,
Eltr2(o2)l : Npzd(r 
- 
e-o,/N)+ l/(1 
- O) r,(p!Y- .,r(L - s-oz/N) - o2C" - F' l?t * Pz)" '
so, 7E[Tz(o)] : p2ge-oz/.t + (t 
- o) 
-@,'\,1 ,ue-oz/N - c": 0ooz \Pt + p21'
. 
--o,/N C. (P, + Pr)'
-e 
- :prop'T2oprpr+pt
Taking logarithms of both sides,
# :toto, +log($pl t 2Qppz + p3) - log c" - 2los(p1+ p2)
Also,
02 Elnzloz)l : _p_Z._o"p Qp? + 2Lprp?_+ pZ . o0"3 .^/" (p, + pr)'
Using these results one can now write,
Etrt 
-- 
N , P,."' ,"(1 - d)(1 - , ,c^'(p\! p')' ^r,(p, + pz)2'- r / \^ pz@p? * 2hptpz + pZ)'
Similarly, one can derive that
Etr2 : Np'(Qp3 + 2Qpg' + p3) 
-NC.L7 -t togp" + rog(Qpl + 2Qprpz + pi)- (h t Pr1"
- 
logC. 
- 
2\og(p1 + pz)l 
- 
F
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1.3. Case III : a1 *0,o2:0. We follow the same procedure:
Eftn(o1,rr)l : Np&(I- e-"'/N)+lrpl:j-(l 
- d)(1 - 
"-ot/N1- otC - c- stCa- F.'1fJ2
=+ 
0[tt9t, tt)] : Nprr-P 
-(r - d)(1 - e-o'/N) - ca:0OSr (s1 + s2i'
ano
Eln2(o,rr)l : worih(1 
-d)(1 -e-q/N)-szca
}E[nz(o, sz)] s1
==+ ---- : j\pz7---:--G(1 
- 
d)(1 - e-"'/N) - Ca:0osz (s1 f s2J"
Using similar calculations as Case II, one gets
and
St
s1 *sz h*Pz
sz:Pz
s1 *sz pr*pz
. AIso,
,n: fu*f t - o)G - e-o,/N),,i, j : r,2; i,I j
\Pt. + Pi )' va
Now putting these values in original profit function of firm 1 and taking first order
condition with respect to a1 one gets,
7ElTlo))- 
e-or1Nn(dp7.+ 2dptpZ + p?) _ r :
oo, 
I 
- 
/t 
@, * pz)z 
L L/ 
- 
(-;"  o
\ 
-ot /N C"(P't, * Pz)2..-- a)
'/ 
n(dpT + 2dptpz + p?)
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Taking logarithms on both sides of the last equation, w€ get
O1
# : loe, + rog($p|-r 2dprpz + p?) - losc. - 2loe(pt -r pz)
Writing the expected profit functions in terms of the parameters,
Eftr1l : Nel(oe3 + 20e!ry + p?) 
- 
NC"J* logpl + tog(Qp?2 + 26ppz + p?)_ L'. rr (p, + pr),
- 
log C. 
- 
2log(p1 + pz)) 
- 
F
and
Eln2l: , NrB ,^(1 
- 
d) ( t 
- 
c-"(P'-* o)' \@r+erY\t-v)\'-M)
1.4. Case IV : o1 10,o" I 0. We now impose pr -- pz:
Eln{o1, sr)] : Npld$ 
- 
"-ot/N)e-"zlN *;ftf t - e-o'\/N e-ozlN *
2$s-or/N s-or/N 
- Qs-or/N - Qe-oz/w1l - orC. - stCa - F
and
Efur2(o2,sz)] : NplQ! 
- 
"-oz/N)e-orlN I ^*^f t - e-ot/N e-o'lN *JltJ2
2Qe-or/N s-or/N 
- Qe-or/N - de-"2/N1l - orC" - szCa - F
Taking first order conditions with respect to s1 and s2 and then solving,
st : t' 
-rs1*s2 sy*s2 2
and also,
s1 : s2 : ffirt - e-or/Ne-oz/N *2Se-or/N.-or/N - Qe-or/N - 6e-"2/N1
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1. SOLUTION 
"O 
MODEL I
These values are put back in the profit functions, and then first order conditions
are enforced with respect to a1 and o2 for n1 and zT-2 respectively. And finally, these
first order conditions are solved to get values of o1 and o2 in terms of the parameters
of the model.
Eftr1(o1)l: NpdG 
- 
"-ot/N)e-oz/N * *ft - e-ol/N e-oz/N *+
2Se-or/N s-ozlN 
- Qe-or/N - 6e-"2/w1 - orCc - F
Efur2(o2)l: NpQG 
- 
"-oz/N)e-ot/N * #O - e-o,lN e-oz/N a+
2$e-or/Ns-or/N 
- Qe-or/N - de-oz/w1- o2Cs- F
0E[n1(o)] Pe-ollN* 
-#":"- n ("-",tN(!+2il+il_C.:o
aElT2(o2)] 
_ ?"-o,/r,r 
"-o,/N 
(L + 26\ * pg"-""/N _ c" : 00oz 4" " \- t -'r/ ' 4"
, }2Elrr@)l 
= 
-p" .:'!-* (e-oi/N (r + 2il + il <0, where,i,i e {r,2}, i + i.ancl --iA- :  4N \6 ,' (
Solving, we get,
Qr+ry(l +zil-O
o-o2lN
It 2(r + 20)
BC.
e-ot /w 
-
K- Ios 2 +1os(1 + 2/) - log(
#-logp*log(
Q'+16c"(1 + 2o)p
+0)
and so,
-0)
+il-logB-logO"
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2. SOLUrrcl\I 
"O 
MODEL II
Now these values are inserted in the profit functions to get expected
terms of the parameters of the model. After simplifications we get,
Eln| 
-
x (p - 4c") L^cc(r+2d) +Q@+20c")p
NC"[log p * log( +d)-losB-losC"l-F
and
Elnrl : .nr fu - 
4c") d'+ry+Q@+20c")
+o
l{C"llog 2 + los(1 + 2il 
- 
Ios( Qr+
r6c"(1 + 2Q)
-il-F
2. Solution to Model
We follow the same solution procedure as in case
the expected profits of firms in four separate cases in
model.
2.L. Case I i ot: 0,oz: 0.
p
II
profits in
of Model I. Here we just report
terms of the parameters of the
and
Elnrl 
- 
*rI
Elnrl 
- 
*rI
r6cc(7+2d) + op
r6c 
"(r+2d)p
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2. SOLUTIOI\r TO MODEL II
2.2. Case II 3ot . Q 
, 
o2 + 0.
trlnr): Ir, + s/l) - 4c"l - Nc"[los p *
Elnrl 
-#Ut -O)4 Lr \
2.3. Case III iot + 0,oz: 0.
Elnrl 
- Ir, +JO)-4c"J - Nc]togp*
Eln,l- IOf - o)
+30-0)-los4-losC"l-F
_ o _ 6),
., n )1+ 30-e
e) 
- 
los 4 
- 
log C"l 
- 
F
Iog(1
4C"(r
Ios(1 + 3Q 
-
4C"0-0- o).
-J1+3d-0
2.4. Case IV iot + 0,oz + 0.
6tv c"0Eln| 
-ry.
and
Efnrl: ry+ yY ' p
+o
NC"[l + los p*los (rl O'*Wg +il-losB-losC"l-F
NC"lr* rog2 + log(1 + 2d 
-Bl - b*(/ O, *fffL + 26 - e) - O)l - F
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to Chapter 2
1. Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 2
Implicit Function Theorem:
Let , f (o, I) -- k.
Then, d,o HdI -W.a,
1.1. Proof for Equation (1). Equation (1) is:
l"-"/*lt {O t q - Sc,I} + 6o(I - t)le-"/N1o-" : 2P
If L.H.S. is written as f (o,.I), then afber partial differentiations we getl,
#: -frb-"'*l'{o + dG -or)} - 
"#[e-olN](1-1) 
< 0
AIso,
y= : 
-11"-"t\ t{o + OQ - oI)} - dale-"/u1t - dale-"/y rr-rl1(/ --1)a - ,,AI Ar t  I L* ' 7\- *' ,t ) 7*r' r Y*t- I t ,^f
1By onr assumption, I/I > o always. Even when all the brands advertise and so the doctor
prescribes all the available brands with equal likeliness, the likeliness of the outcome that "no drug
is prescribed to the consumer" is always positive.
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2. APPEI\DIX 2: IVUMERICAL AI]ALYSIS
Thus, a sufficient condition for #
tffl >[1 _ e-ot*)
1.2. Proof for Equation (2). Equation (2) is:
|e-"/NlI (t - *I) + a(I - 1)[s-"/N1Q-r) : 9-
If L.H.S. is written as f (o,1), then after partial differentiations we get,
y : 
-!k-'ry'(t - a/) - a(I - r)2 k-o/NlQ_D < 00o ly'' Jw N r'  I
Also,
Af : _.o(t - o'I\ _/N1r _ 1o_o/N1U_t)rQ - L)oa ^.raI t------ * alle-"'' l- - te -'- l' 't-- ,no- - ol
Thus, a sufficient condition for 
,U < 0, is that
,(/ - L)o,L 1,/ 1)[1 -e-"/N]
2. Appendix 2: Numerical Analysis
2.L Analysis of Equation (1).
V-"/*l' {O * a - $c,I} + 6o(I - r)le-"/N1Q-tl : 9P
We solve for o as .f increases from L to 10 given different values of. Q, a, P, C and
N. It is observed that as n increases, value of o goes down.
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2. APPEI'{DIX 2: 
^TUMERICAL 
AI{ALYS$
Conditions on coefficients: N 
-
100, C 
- 
10
I- I;o 
- 
1.6864 x 106
I- 2;o- 894043.
I- 3;o- 600482.
I- 4;o- 451444.
I- 5;o 
- 
361556.
I- 6;o- 301483.
I- 7;o- 258514.
I- B;o- 226260.
I- 9;o- 20L158.
I- 10; o- 181068.
1000000, 0- 0.5) Q
O- o.7) e- IIL\, P 
-
Conditions on coefficients: N 
- 
100000,
150, C- 20
I- I;o :168640.
I- 2;o :88749.
I- 3;o :59557.4
I- 4;o :44764.2
I- 5;o- 35847.2
I- 6;o :29889.4
I- 7;o :25628.6
I- B;o- 22430.4
I- 9;o : 19941.6
I- 10: o 
- 
L7949.8
Conditions on coefficients: N 
- 
500000, 0
go,c-5
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- 
0.3 ) e, 
- 
L/L8.5, P 
-
2. APPEI'{DIX 2: I{\-|MERICAL AIVALYS/S
I; o 
- 
843700.
2; o 
- 
438131.
3; o 
- 
293547.
4; o 
- 
220525.
5; o 
- 
176557.
6;o 
- 
147196.
7; o 
- 
126203.
B;a 
- 
II0449.
9; o 
- 
98190.8
1o; o
2.2. Analysis of equation (2).
le-"tNlt(r -c"I)+a(I
solve for o as n increases from 1 to
observed that as n increases. value
Conditions on coeffi.cients: N
100, C 
- 
10
I- !;o 
- 
1.52606 x 106
I- 2;o- 814978.
I- 3;o- 548565.
I- 4;o- 4I280L.
I- 5;o- 330778.
I- 6;o- 275909.
I- 7;o 
- 
236638.
I- B;o- 207L46.
I)1"-"tNl(1-1) 
- #
10 given different values of 0, e,, P, C and
of o goes down.
I-
I-
I-
I_
I-
I_
I-
I-
I-
I-
We
N. It is
9B
2. APPtrI\DIX 2: I]UMERICAL AITALYSIS
I- 9;o : L84188.
I- I0;o- 165809.
o Conditions on coefficients: N 
- 
100000,
150, C
o- o.7,, a
N 
- 
500000, O- 0.3) e.- f /L8.5, P-
I- r;o
I- 2;o
I- 3;o
I- 4;o
I- 5;o
I- 6;o
I- 7; o
I- B;o
I- 9;o
:83951.3
: 56400.3
- 
424IL.7
: 33972.3
:28330.9
:24295.
-- 
21265.
: 18906.7
I- 10; o : L7019.1
Conditions on coefficients:
go,c-5
I- L;o
I- 2;o : 394881.
I- 3;o :26498I.
I- 4;o : L99202.
I- 5;o : 159547.
I- 6;o : 133047.
[- 7;o
I- B; o-99861.1
I- 9;o- 88786.1
I- L0:o- 7992L.7
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TReLn 1. Details on FDA Approval, Generic Entry & Manufacturer
Brand Name FDA Generic Manufacturer
Approval Approval
Year YEar
RX Statins
Mevacor
Zocor
Pravachol
Iescol
lipitor
Baycol
SSRI/SNRI
Celexa
prozac
Iuvox
paxil
Zoloft
Effexor
PPI
Prilosec
Prevacid
Aciphex
Protonix
HIV-RTI
Videx
Epivir
Zertt
Hivid
Retrovir
Ztagen
Rescriptor
Sustiva
Viramune
Trizivir
Combivir
ANTIHISTAMINES
Allegra
Zyrtec
Astelin
Semprex-D
1987 2002 Merck
1991 N/A Merck
1991 N/A Briston-myers squibb
1993 N/A Novartis
1996 N/A Pfizer
1997 N/A bayer
1998 2004 forest
1987 200L Elililly lDista1994 N/A solvay
1992 2004 GlaxoSmithKline
1991 N/A Pfizer
1993 N/A WyethAyerst
19Bg 2001 Astra Zeneca
1995 N/A TAP Pharm
1999 N/A Eisai
2000 N/A WyethAyerst
1991 N/A BristolMyers Squibb
1995 it{/A GlaxosmithKline
1994 N/A BMS Virology
L992 N/A Roche
1987 N/A GlaxoSmith Kline
1998 N/A GlaxoSmith Kline
L997 N/A Agouron
1998 N/A BristonMyres Squibb
1996 N/A Boehringerlngelheim
2000 N/A GlaxoSmith Kline
1997 NIA GlaxoSmith Kline
1996 N/A Aventis
1995 N/A Pfizer
1996 N/A Hedpointe
1994 N/A Celltech Pharm
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TaeLB 2. Details on DTCA expenditures($000)
Brand Name 1996 1997 1998 1999
RX Statins
Mevacor
Zocor
Pravachol
Iescol
lipitor
Baycol
SSF.-I/SNRI
Celexa
prozac
Iuvox
paxil
Zo\oft
Effexor
PPI
Prilosec
Prevacid
Aciphex
HIV-RTI
Videx
Epivir
Zertt
Hivid
Retrovir
Zragen
Rescriptor
Sustiva
Viramune
Combivir
Antihistamines
Allegra
Zyrtec
Astelin
Semprex-D
0
40749.6
19104.2
977.6
0
N/A
N/A
0
0
0
0
7559.5
0
0
N/A
0
167.9
0
0
0
N/A
I\/A
N/A
0
N/A
19,673.00
28,794.20
0
0
0
45,593.80
64,693.80
0
0
0
N/A
22,610.40
0
1006.1
0
6,285.20
40,208 .40
0
N/A
0
0
2,640.90
0
885
N/A
0
N/A
194.7
542.2
63,92r.90
54,444.30
0
0
0
39,724.70
58,055 .20
637.5
7,754.30
0.00
0
37,516.80
0
0
0
25.00
49,736. 10
0
N/A
0
0
r,256.60
0
0
0
42
20.9
406.7
3,039.30
52,515.30
75,235.00
0
0
0
34,187.50
0.00
994
54,628. 10
0.00
0
15 1. 10
0
31 ,513 .20
0
0.00
77,303.60
0
0
0
0
0.00
0
0
r,564.70
0
720.9
248.7
r,976.50
42,788.00
57,068 .40
0
0
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APPENDIX C
Appendix to Chapter 3
1. Numerical Analysis
The goal here is to see if in equilibrium,
Q,1
and
Q,1
Hence, equilibrium values of.o1f N and o2f N are obtained for different values of
P , C , d, a1 and o2 . The above two conditions seem to hold throughout the analysis.
L.L. P:100, c:I0, d:.0001.
1.1.1. or 1az.
Q,1 : .L,az 
--.9 ) orllY : -9.09245,o21|V -- 11.2896
Q1: .2, az 
- 
.8, * o1f IY 
- 
-B .22939, o2l I',{ : 10.3088
Q1 : .3,a2: .7,* o1f IY 
- 
-7.55197,o21|V :9.49782
Q1 : .4,a2:.6, * o1f IY 
- -6.72527,0211{ - 8.51699
r02
1. I\I]MERICAL AI{ALYS$
I.L.2. a1
a1 
- 
.9, a2
e,1 
- 
.8, az: .2, ) o1f IY 
- 
10.3088, ozllY :
Q1: .7,a2 
--.3,* o1f IY -9.49782,ozlIV:
e1 
- 
.6, az 
- 
.4, i ot lN 
- 
8.51699 
, 
o2l IY :
L.2. P 
- 
100,, C : 10, 0 
- 
.0501.
I.2.I. e1
-8.22939
-7.55L97
-6 .72527
Q,1 
- 
.I,az:.9 ) orllY : 
-2.81653,o21|V - 4.97133
at 
-- 
.2,a2 
-- 
.8,+ o1f N : 
-L.94875,o2f N :3.99728
e7: .3,e2: .7,+ o1f N : 
-1.27157,o2f N :3.20279
er: .4,(r2: .6,+ o1f N : 
-0.486967,o2f N :2.29271
7.2.2. a1) az.
Q.1
0l : .8, (r2: .2,+ o1f N 
-_ 
3.99728,or1N: 
-1.94875
er: .7,d2: .3,+ o1f N :3.20279,ot|N : 
-L.27I57
01 : .6, dz 
-- 
.4,+ o1f N :2.2927L,or1N : 
-0.486967
L.3. P: 100, C : I0, d: .L50L.
1.3.1. a1 1dz.
Q1 
-- 
.L,az:.9 + o1f IY 
- 
-1.57839,0211r{ :3.66752
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er: .2,d2: .8,+ orf N : 
-0.7289,o21N :2.76735
o.L: .3,e2: .7,+ o1f N : 
-0.L22105,o2f N :2.LL402
Qr: .4,,Q2: .6,+ o1f N :0.425242,o21N : 1.5317
L.3.2. a1> az.
et: .9,e2: .l + orf N :3.66752,o21N : 
-1.57839
o1 : .8, a2: .2,+ o1f N :2.76735,o21N : 
-0.7289
dr: .7,e2: .3,+ orf N :2.LL402,orlN : 
-0.L22L05
dr: .6,e2: .4,+ orf N : 1.5317, orlN :0.425242
L.4. P 
-100' C:I0rQ:.250I.
L.4.I. a1 1az.
o1 : .1, az: .9 + o1f N : 
-0.908607,o2f N :2.97629
o.7: .2,d2: .8,+ oLf N: 
-0.1396L2,o2f N :2.24855
o1 : .3, e2: .7,+ orf N : 0.350379,o21N : t.78791
dr: .4,a2: .6,+ o1f N :0.736797,o21N :1.41902
1.4.2. a1) az.
Q,1 
- 
.9, a2
Q1 : .B, az
Q1: .7,a2: .3,* o1f IV 
- 
I.7B79L,6zlIV 
- 
0.350379
Q1: .6,a2: .4,* o1f IV 
- 
I.4L902)02llY :0.736797
LA4
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1.5. P- 100)C- 10, O-.3501.
1.5. 1 . e,1
Q.1
Ql : .2, az: .8, * o1f IY 
- 
0.218137, o2f IY 
- 
2.02075
Q1
Q,1 : .4, a2
1.5.2. e1
Q1 
- 
.9, az 
- 
.1 ) ot I I{ : 2.54128, o2l IY : -0 .431594
Q,1
Q1
Q4 : .6, az 
- 
.4,* olf IY 
- 
1.43634, ozl IV 
- 
0 .923499
1.6. P- 100,C:10, O-.4501.
1.6.1. e1
a1 
- 
.L, az: .9 4 0t I IV : -0 .0928764, o2 f IY - 230AL4
Q,1
A1
Q,1
L.6.2. e1
e1 
- 
.9,, a2 
- 
.1 * or l l{ : 2.30014, o21 IV
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Q1 
- 
.8,a2: .2,* orllV: 1.94095,o21|V :0.454288
Q,1 : .7, az: .3, * orllV 
- 
L70247, ozll'{ : 0.799796
Q,1
L.7. P- 100,C:10, O-.5001.
L.7 .I. a1
Q,1
Q'1 : '2, a2
Q1 
- 
.3, a2
Q1 : .4,,a2: .6, * orllV 
- 
I.I2559,ozllV :1.53101
I.7.2. e1
Q,1
Q,1
 lLI.I
A1 :
1.9. P- 100rc
1.8.1. e1
.8, az 
- 
.2, * o1f IY 
- 
1.93 r37 ,, o2l IY 
- 
0 .545248
.7 
, 
az 
- 
.3, * o1f IY 
- 
r.72064, oz I IY : 0.873437
.6,,a2: .4,1 o1f IY 
- 
1.53101 ,c2llY : L.r2559
-10, d-.6501.
Q1 
- 
.I,az: .9 * orll,{ :0.374032,o21|V: 2.L548
'2, az
'3, az
Q.1
A1 :
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Qr: .4,o.2: .6,+ o1f N : I.28644,orlN : 1.64845
1.8.2. c.1) dz.
Q1 : .9,a2: .1 + o1f IY 
- 
2.I54B,02llY 
- 
0.3L4032
Q.1
A1
Q,1
1.9. P- 100,C:10, d-.7501.
1.9. 1. a1
1 .9639 t, oz I IV 
-
1 .8055 2, oz l lY :
I.64845, oz I IY :
0,755234
r.05464
L.28644
a1 
- 
.I, az
Q'1 
- 
.2, az
Q,1
Q,1 : .4,a2: .6, * o1f IY 
- 
1.38052,ozllV 
- 
I.72B4B
L.9.2. e1
Q,1
Q'1 
- 
.8, dz
a1 
- 
.7,a2
Q1 
- 
.6, a2
1.10. P- 100,C:10, O-.8501.
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1.10.1. e1
Q'1 : .L, az
Q,1 
- 
.2, az: .8, * o1f IV 
- 
0.954378, 02ll{ 
- 
2.06904
e,1 
- 
.3, az : .7, * oL I IV 
- 
I.24302, oz I IY : I.94437
Q,1
L.L}.2. e1
a1 
- 
.9,a2: .1 * otll'{ :2.LB903,a2llV :054464
Q1 
- 
.B,az: .2,4 0rllV:2.06904,0211'{ :0.954378
Q1 : .7, az 
- 
.3, * ot I N 
- 
I.94437, oz I IY : L24302
Q'1 
- 
.6, az
1.11. P- 100,C:10, O-.9501.
1. 11. 1. e1
Q1 : .L,az: .9 * orll'{ : 0.62B72L.,orlN 
- 
2.2297
Q,7- .2,a2:.8,* o1f IY 
- 
1.03497,02 1|Y:2.L3033
Q'1 
- 
.3, az
Q1 
- 
.4, az: .6, * o1f IV 
- 
I.547I4, o2l IY : 1.88301
I.LL.2. e1
e,1 
- 
.9,a2: .1 * orlIY :2.2297,or1N: 0.62872I
:
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Q.1 : -8, az 2.L3033 , o2l Ir{ : L.03497
2. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS FOR CORNER SOLU"IOAIS
er: .7,e2: .3,+ o1f N :2.07522,021N : 1.32355
dr: .6,d2: .4,+ orf N : 1.88301, 02lN :1.54774
2. Numerical Analysis for Corner Solutions
Here we do numerical analysis of equation (16) and (17). The otlN here corre-
sponds to equation (17) and orlN corresponds to equation (16), Numerical analysis
is performed for only those values of @ for which in Appendix C (1) we obtained
negative values for o1f N.
2,L, a1( a2 and a1 ( 0.
2.I.7. P 
-100, C:I0, d:'0001'
Q.1
er: .2,e2: .8,+ o1f N : 
-1.38522,o2f N :2.07947
Q|: .3,at2: .7,+ o1f N: 
-0.846508,o2f N : 1.94595
d7: .4,d2: .6,+ o1f N: 
-0.404882,o2f N: 1.79183
2.L.2. P: 100, C :10, d : .0501.
Q1 : .I ,az: .9 =+ o1f IY 
- 
-1.58532,o21|V - 2.20278
dr: .2,e2: .8,+ olf N: 
-0.956546,o2f N : 2.09189
or : .3, e2: .7,+ o1f N : 
-0.514349,o2f N : 1.96715
dr: .4,d2: .6,+ o1f N : 
-0.14887L,o2f N : L.82461,
2.L.3. P: 100, C : t0, d: .750L.
Q,1
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dr: .2,d2: .8,+ o1f N : 
-0.431304,o2f N :2.L1628
(r1-: .3,()2: .7,+ orf N: 
-0.0687546,o2f N :2.00825
dr: .4,d2: .6,+ o1f N :0.224667,o21N : 1.88713
2.L.4. P 
-100, C:10,6:.2501.
eL: .L,dz: .9 + o1f N : 
-0.554242,o2f N :2.22463
d7: .2,Q2: .8,+ olf N : 
-0.0920872,o2f N :2.14009
et.: .3,e2: .7,+ orf N :0.236226,o21N :2.04773
er: .4,e2: .6,+ qf N :0.496675,o21N :1.94597
2.L.5. P:100, C:t0, d:.3501.
Q,1
Q1 : .2,a2: .8, * o1f IV 
- 
0.158304,o21|V 
- 
2.L6335
Q1 : .3, a2
a1 : .4, az : .6, * 01 I I{ - 0 .710755, oz I IV 
- 
2.00153
2.I.6. P- 100,C:10, O-.450I .
Q.1
Q,1 _ .2, az: .8, * oLllV 
- 
0.3565L7,, o2llV _ 2.18607
A1
Q1: .4, az: .6, * o1f IY 
- 
0.887314, o2llV 
- 
2.054L8
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